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INTRODUC'r ION 
Lorsqu 1 il n 1 est pas en notre pouvoir de discerner les 
plus vraies opinions, nous devons suivre les plus probables. 
Descartes. 
It has been said that 1uneri ca - creative in so many 
fields, has no philosophy but only reflects the specula tions 
of other lands. This was true in the ea rly days of her think-
ing age, but today the philosophy of 11.merica is boi•rowed by 
thinkere of other lands more than one may believe. The New 
Continent has actually great le a ders of thought of whom the 
writer of this thesis, a s a European, is proud to be the 
humble, thankful pupil. 
Our aim in this thesis is to present here some of the 
rather revolutionary tendencies of the philosophy of William 
Jame s, limiting our field to his theory of pluralism. The 
method of ·which the problem will be investiga ted is found 
within a fe w questions which introduce also the l~e ader to the 
general ground to be covered. Thus we ask: Is the universe 
one or many? Is it made of parts or is it a perfect whole? 
Is the world composed of a multitude of independent elements? 
.-1.re they interacting? VVha t are the reasons for the conflict 
bet·Ne en pluralism and monism? Is James's pluralism poly-
theistic or is it theistic? 
il 
I 
I shall, firs t, bring forward in a biographical slcetch 
the different influences exercised upon William James; then, 
I shall try t o establish some connections between pluralism 
and other interpretations of t;he universe, pointing out the 
result of my inv estigat ions; finally , I shall endeavor to 
present pluralism as a general system of thought. 
Contrary to ·what may be expected, the conc lusion will 
remain on a neutral ground. This is done in order to respect 
the reader" s freedom of thought. ;l'he scientist is satisfied 
When finding new light on an already known field, and the 
explorer is still a lover of the homeland i n spite of his 
voyages of di scoveries. So, we will move from partiality to 
impartiality by dis coverin g and acknowledg ing the several 
biases of the problem. And, sinc e all new philosophical 
realms of thoughts are somehow ineluctably rooted in the past, 
we feel just ified in widen i ng our horizon by making a thorough 
and thoughtful investigation. This end eventually achiev ed 
will be sufficent reward, i f, through 'this new fas hion of 
thinking we can find more light. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BIOGrlAPHICAL OUTLOOK 
were Protest~nt, and they appear to have been people of edu-
cation and char~cter, but in none of them was found the incli-
nation to letters and religious speculations manifested in 
William James and his f a ther . The paternal gr~ndfather of 
viilliam James, the last ancest or to come from Europe prospered 
and ama ssed a large fortune promptly. He was one of the or-
ganizers a nd the first Vice-President of the Albany Saving s 
Bank, founded in 1820, and of the ..: l.lbany Chamber of Commerce. 
Henry J~mes, William J ames 's f a ther, was born in 1811. 
He was apparently a man of unusual activity . In 1830 he gra d-
u a ted from Union College , Schenectady, and in 1835 entered the 
Princeton Theological Seminary . By the time he had co mpleted 
t wo ye a rs of his seminar y course, his dis cont ent with the 
orthodox dispensation was no longer to be doubted anu he left 
the school. In 1840 he ,was married to ifiary Walsh , a sister of 
1 a fello w student who had sh<H"'ed his religious doubts a nd like 
I him left minis try and s erninary . Mary Walsh was a gentle lady 
who presided with cheerful indulgence over the development of 
her five children. William J ames spoke of her very seldom 
3 
after her death, but then always with a sort of tender 
reverence. She supplied an element of serenity and discretion 
to the co uncils of the f amily of which they were often in need. 
Viilliam, first son of Henry J ame s and Mary Walsh, was 
born in New York on the eleventh of J anuary, 1842. The boy 
derived much from his father who was an impressive and inter-
esting personality. He was the constant companion of his chil-
dren and poured out his own ideas and emotions before them in 
a wonderful way . They never achieved a truly philosophic 
formulation of his own religious position and conception of 
God a nd · of man's proper x>elation to hLn. The diary of his 
daughter a lice says that at the question to what he should 
like to have done about his funeral he ans we'red: "T.ell him to 
say only this; 1Here lies a man , who has thought all his life 
that the ce remonies a ttending birth, ma rriage, and death were 
all damned nonsense.• Don 1 t let him say a word rnorel 111 
v·illiam James never acknowledged himself as feeling 
particularly indebted to any of the numerous schools and tutors 
to whom his f ather • s oscillations between Nevv York, Europe, 
and. Newport confided him. Nor were the changes any less fre-
quent af'ter the f amily moved to Europe when Vv'illiam was thir-
teen years old. London, Paris, Boulogne-sur-Mer, and Geneva 
furnishe_d hi.~ -~_urly education. .'it sixteen we find him at the 
1 The Letters of Willirun J ames , Vol. I, 16. 
4 
r 
College de Boulognes which was his e arliest experience of 
thorough teaching and earnest work . we find him l a ter a stu-
den t in Geneva, then at Bonn- run- Rhein, where he learned German . 
His limited educat ion was greatly enl arged thl'ough amu sements 
and excursions beyond the bounds of his prescribed studie s. 
There was p rofit also for him in the restlessness of h is fa the 
which threw the boy into ~ickening colli sion with plac es, 
1
1 people, and ide a s unknown to many schoolboys. 
I 
At nineteen he 
had attained t o an a cquaintance with English and E'rench re-
views, boo ks, paint i ngs, and public affairs. He began y oung 
to be a wide reader, and in many languages. The inf l uences 
and circumstances wh ich shaped in his yocith, surely account 
for t h e e a sy assura nce with which he passed from one field 
of inquiry t o another in his maturity . 
Nothi ng has yet been said about the occupation to which 
1 he first t h ought to devote himself : painting . Before he had 
reached hi s •teens , drawing was one of his passions. Later he 
took lessons in Paris , and under Hunt in Ne vvp ort, he began to 
show great aptitude. Hunt, lately a student of Couture in 
Paris, was i mbued with the great class ic a l i deals of art . 
Under his tu·telage Wil l i am t h ought of the poss ibilit l es of a 
career in this f ield in spite of his dislike of a bad artist 
ana. the acknowledgement of many imperfections in hi s work. 
"I am mys elf a geo d draughtsman , and have a very lively 
interest in pictures, s tatues, architecture and decora-
5 
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tion, and a keen sensibility to artistic effect. 
extremely poor visualizer, and f :ind myself often 
reproduce in my mind ' s eye pictures which I have 
examined. 112 
But I am an 
unable to J 
most carefu.ll~ 
I 
Later still, from Germany he vvrote : 11 Je ne suis pleine-
ment decid.b ~ bssayer le metier de peintre ••• 110 very soon af te 
however, he left pencil and brush quite untouched except later 
on to record an observation in the laboratory or to amu se his 
children, for he turned from ar tistic to scientific work. It 
is true that he aba ndoned the studio for s cientific studies 
but he was always to hav.e · an artistic temperament . Alth ough 
he now dedicated his studies to science it would. be misleading 
to co n sider William purely scientific. In fact he was not yet 
settled and unable to learn one thing thoroughly . Never was 
V1 illiam James a pure s cientist nor a pure al ... tist for at this 
very time of' his career he enjoyed nothing better than to dis -
cuss Renan with his brother. He was already a splendid. ex-
ample of' a student embracing the whole of' human consideration 
and experience. 
His father also had a direct influence upon his life and 
philosophy. He himself' gives inter•es ting details of this 
paternal influence: 
I have often tried to imagine what sort of a 
figure my father mi ght have made, had he been 
2Quoted by c. H . Grattan, The Three Jameses, 111. 
3~tters, Vol. I, 23. 
6 
==w=-===-- -- --
born in a genuinely theological a ge, with the best 
minds about him fermenting with the mystery of the 
Divinity , and the air full of definitions and 
theories and counter~theories, and strenuous rea-
sonings and contentions, about God's relat ion to 
mankind ••• he would have played a prominent ••• part 
in the struggles of his time , for he was a relig-
i ous prophet and g ~nius, if ever prophet and 
genius there were . · 4 
The combination of variety and contradiction of this semi-
mystic semi-Hegelian pantheistic theolog,could but influence 
his son bred with a cosmopolitan education . 11 What my very 
flesh and bones cry out for 11 , wr ites Henry James, or ., 11 is no 
This does not mean tha t young J ames was sat isfied with his 
father's philos ophy, for many a time his letters show tha t he 
received a nd read rnany articles from his father's pen but with 
the persisting result of incomprehension~ 
I have read your article, wh ich I got in Teplitz , 
several times carefully. I must confess that the 
darkness which to me has always hung over what 
you have written gn these subjects is ha rdly at 
all cleared up. · 
But it ._. remov-es __ · all possible doubt as to the tremendous 
influence exerted by the father upon his son, and more an- · 
· ~b.e-Ll"t$rary Remains of Henry James, 12. 
5Ibid., 39 . 
6Letters , Vol. I, 96. 
7 
nounces an anti cipated: interest in speculat ive thinking. The 
bent of William J ames to war d philosophy in general and for the 
several types of religious experiences in particular, most 
probably have origina ted through the a scendancy of the home. 
And the incomprehension and dissatisfaction resulted in many 
n ew tendencies for research and expression. 
William J ame s wa s one man from the beginning to the end. 
In spite of his great openmindness and versa tility he always 
remained loyal to his fundamental convictions. One charac-
teristic around which his whole thought g;r>ew is the idea of 
the essentially a ctive and interested cha racter of the human 
mind. He left the impression of a real gentleman: hospitality 
blending \rl th an extraordina ry intellectual chiva lry were 
crowned by a rema rkable reflection of his peculiar social 
genius. "He was a man quick to reach to the he art of another 
man, quick to praise, quick to esteem the gifts of others ••• 
Beginning with the older generati on of his father a nd teachers 
and ending with t}?.e younger generation of his ch ildren and 
stude nts, h is life was a continuous succession of marvelous 
human discoveries." 7 William James never t ried to win dis-
ciples neither to compe l a llegiance to his own doctrines, nor 
to found a school. But he taught a nd helped countless , 
young men to love philosophy by f a cing the problems of the uni- ~ 
verse in an intelligent, thoughtful, and independent spirit. 
Vf R .B. Perry, Collected Es s a ys and Reviews ; ._ Pref., , IX-X. 
8 
B. The Three Successive Periods. 
1. As Phys i ologist. 
As a bo y William James ea.r•ly s h owed all those 
traits of character which later• marked him as a personality. 
One of his most :iistinctive characteristics was activity, and 
quickness of mind marked him all his life. Assiduously, early 
in life, he recorded the observations of his contact ~~th 
things. 
A ne w turn wa s g iven to -~Vi lliam' s imaginat i on when for his 
fifteenth birthday he received a microscope from his father. 
I 
Surely this was h is first serious acquaintance with science. 
A fe w years l a ter, when studying in Geneva, he borrowed a copy 
I I of 11 Anatomie 11 by Sappey a nd went to study skeletons at the 
1 1vlus eum. 8 
In the autumn of 1861 James began wha t was to become a 
1 ife long connection 1:vi thtsciences by regis taring for the study 
of chemis try in the Lawrence .Scientific School. The chemical 
laboratory of the school was under the charge of Charles w. 
Eliot who writes: 11 I first came in contact with Yd lliam James 
i in the academic year 1861 - 62 ••• James was a very interesting 
and agreeable pupil, but was not wholly devoted to the study of 
chemistry ••• His excurslons into other sciences a nd realms of 
8c. H. Grattan, The Three Jameses, 110. 
9 
I thought were not infrequent; his mind was excursive, and he 
liked. experimenting, particularly novel experimenting ••• Ire-
ceived a distinct impression that he possessed unusual mental 
powers, remarkable spirituality , and great personal charm. n9 
From a letter dated Septembei' 16, 1861, v1hich contains 
much extravagance and intimate raillery we can, however, have 
a glimpse of 'Nhat will be clearly found later on in his life: 
" ••• I can be as independent as I please, and want t o live re-
gardless of the go od or bad opinion of everyone. I shall have 
a splendid. chance to try ••• I am sure that that feeling is a 
right one, and I mean to live according to it if I can . If I 
do, I think I shall turn out all right. 1110 
-1·ve are still far away from ·villiam James the philosopher; 
yet in the srune letter, referring to his mother's request to 
. keep a memorandum of the money he receives he writes 11 ••• it was 
I I that she might know exactly what sums the proa.igal philosophe_r:_~s 
really gave out. 11 In another letter may be seen the early ten-
dencies of the brilliant professor of Harvard. The freedom 
concerning himself already found was corroborated by a reflec-
tion he made concerning one of his cousins to whom he was fond-
ly devoted: " •• ~this letter ••• revives all sorts of poignant 
9Henry James, 'rhe Letters of William James, Vol. I, 31-32. 
l0Ibid., 35 . 
{~'un~ferlining nrl.ne. 
J.O 
memories and ~nakes her live again in all her lightness and 
freedom.-::- Fe w spirits have been more free-l~ than hers ••• nll 
Nothing can interest one more than to read the numerous 
~ letters v~ittsn by Jam~s as a student of chemistry and compara-
1 tive ana tomy of the Lawrence Scientific School in Carnbridge. 
I . -
There vie have the sure developrnen t of an unusual young man. 
From one of his letters addi•essed to h l s cousin "Kitty" ( Mrs. w. 
H. ·Prince) I quote a few words: 11 I arn back here again, study- J 
ing this time comparative Anatomy. I am obliged before the l5t 
of January (1864) to make finally and irrevocably 'the choice 
of a profession 1 ••• I have four alternatives: Natural History, 
JYiedicine, Printing, Beggary."l2 
On September 1863 he was still undecided for in a letter 
writ ten to his mother we find these v,rords: 11 I feel very 1i1uch 
the importance of making soon a final choice of my business in 
life. I stand no w at the place where the road forks ••• On one 
side is scien~, upon the other business, ••• with medicine ••• I 
13 
confess I hesitate ••• 11 Although the follo wing year James be-
gan the regular course of medicine he had arrived at no clear 
professional purpose and no selection of any particular field I 
of study. The same year James was transferred from the Depart- . 
ment of Chemistry and became a student in the Department of 
-::11nderlin.1ng ~ . Ml.ne. 
l~Henr y James, op. cit., 37. 
12The Letters of William James, Vol. I, 43-44. 
l 3.Ibid.; · . Vol. I; 45-46. ·-
11 
I 
Comparative .Anatomy and Physiology aftel" t wo years of labor. 
Now the student works among s keletons and "horrors enough to 
freeze the blood. " He was the only member of his class to make 
drawings out of his microscopic researches. 
Louis Agassiz's public lectures given in Boston (1861) h a d 
influenced the pl"Ornising student and when Agassiz planned an ex-
pedition to Brazil, Nllliam James decided to go. 'Ihe expedition 
left New York on the first of ii.prll, 1865. .1.1ready philosophy 
had undoubtedly appealed to him for he wrote from Brazil, " \Vhen 
I get home, I'm going to study philosophy all my days. 11 The 
tide of contemporary inquiry, driven for ward by the storm of 
Darwinian controversy was in the air and the undecided student 
of medicine vvas interested by the metaphysical specula tion to-
ward a fresh examination of nature. It was for Na tural History 
that he h a d joined Professor Agassiz in an expedition to the 
Amazon. From there he revealed more and more clearly in his 
letters that he was rather an adventurer and lover of landscape 
than a geologist. There he found himself indiffel"ent to birds, 
beasts, or fishes' classification; this side of the outer world 
was being seen as a secondar y angle of approach. filready James 
was incorrigibly interested in the causes, values, ~nd. purposes 
of thing s. 
Back from Brazil in i~arch, 1866 he entered' the IVIassachu ... 
setts General Hospit a l as undergra duate interne and in autumn 
\James resume d his s t utlies in the Harvard lVIed1.cal School. 
12 
Nevertheless we find him thinking here and there. In a letter \ 
I 
dated from Boston, June 8, 1866 we find these words: 11 ••• havingl 
been in a pretty unsettled theoretical condition myself, from i 
which I hop Ed some positive conclusions might emerge worthy to 
be presented to you as the last work on the Kosmos and the hu-
man soul ••• 11 A few lines further James writes about the 11 ori-
ginal constitution of things" and a 11 tranquil confidence in the 
right ordering of the v1,hole. 1114 His desire to love a life ac-
cording to nature with practical contentment and entirely with-
in his ovm breast are almost his own woi•ds and surely the very 
throught of our medicine student at that time. Through study-
ing medicine James is already interested in the field of philo-
sophical speculations. He reported himself as attending a 
philosophical lecture by Charles Pierce and discussing philo-
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
sophical problems with Oliver ~v endell Holmes, Jr. To a depress- ! 
; :~: i::: P::l r ::o:::::; .''a::: :::: l ~:: e ::. :::::h ~::.:: s ::d can I 
already be clearly foreseen and especially the one moving slow-
ly toward philosophy. 
James interrupted his :course impelled by the conviction 
that his health required him to stop. He sailed for Europe in 
April, 1867 and so once again his studies and plans were de-
feated. This illness accompanied with deep depression of spirit 
14 Henry James, op. cit., 77. 
13 
and his introspective tendencies made thing s grow worse. Prom 
Dresden and Bohemia where he spent the summer, he .moved to Ber-
lin attending fe w lectures at the University a nd spending most 
of his t ime stud ying t he physiology of the nei•vous system. We 
may, here again, perceive the philosophical tendencies. In 
spite of his v a gabond life a nd his 'physical a nd mental depres- . 
sion, or maybe r a ther because of these he writes about "some 
philosophical discoveries" tha t he may make. Having read an 
a rticle from the pen of his father, the a nswer of J ames presents 
him as thinking philosophically. 11 lvly questions 11 , he wrote 11 ••• 
belong to the understanding, a nd I suppose deal entirely with 
the •natural constitution' of things; ••• the very language you 
use ontologicall~ is also so extensively rooted in the finite 
and phenomenal that I cannot avoi d accepting it as it were in 
its mechanical sense, when it becomes to me devoid of signifi-
cance .ul5 If hilliam James b e came a philosopher this is due 
partly to his father's influ ence . Far fl"om home the young man 
lread his father's articles with gre a ter interest, then, through 
a fili a l correspondence he became a critic: "But ho w can the 
real movement have its ris e in the phenomena l? ••• You speak 
sometimes of our natural life a s our ·whole conscious life; 
sometimes of our con sciousness a s composed of both elements, 
finite and infinite ••• I have never understood your pos t tion. 1116 
15Henry J ames, op. cfl: t., 96-97. 
16Ibid., 119. 
14 
Speaking about his physiological and psychological studies we 
find J ame s again and again undecided but alvmys wor king . "You 
probably thinl{ I am working strai ght ahead - towa1•ds a definite 
aim. 17 Alas, No~ 11 As a rna tter of f a ct he was working and pr·e-
paring h imself for his future philosophical c a reer in spite of 
his studies in physiology and the fulfilment of his hope a t the 
beginning of his care er at Cambridge. 11 I find myself ge tting 
more interested in physiology and nourishing a hope tha t I may 
be ab le to make its study (and perhaps its t each ing) my pro-
fession."l8 
Spending most of his time by reading Kant's Kritik, 
L'Ann~e Philosophig~e and other simil ar \~ itings, travelling in 
Germany, Switzerland, and France, he became his own master d.ur-
ing the last fe w months of the year 1868. Vie may safely say 
that the main line of t hought which he will follow more than 
t wenty years later is already rough-cast in h i s mind, already 
latent: Plur alism, Pragmatism, Empiricism, and doctrine ~ the 
l7Henry James, op . cit ., 119. 
18Letters, Vol. I, 134. 
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make the enjoyment of our brothers stand us in 
the stead of a final cause ••• The whole depends 
on what individuals accomplish ••• V~' e long for sym-
pathy, for a purely personal communication, first 
with the soul of1~he world, and then for the soul of our fellows. " 
On January 3, 1868, he wrote too. Vv . Holmes, Jr.: 11 ~ihen 
I get home let 1 s establish a philosophical society to have 
regular meetings and discuss none but the very tallest and 
20 broadest questions. 11 Peculiar ambitions for a physiologist! 
Disappointed in his chief hopes but much matured in 
character and thought, James returned to Cambridge in November, 
1868. The following June he obtained his medical degree but 
without thought of engaging in a physician career. Under the 
paterna l roof he remained three years as an invalid condemned 
ophy. Our M. D. is reading but his note book - record of his 
re a ding s, is quite oriented toward philosophy. In March 1869 
lhe wrote to Thomas W. Ward: " 1¥1algr~ la vue des mishes o,\. nous 
vivons et qui nous tiennent p ar l a gorge~ There is an inex-
tinguishable sp a rk which will ••• flash out and reveal the axis-
tence ••• of reason at the bottom of things ••• I 1m s wamped in an 
empirical philosophy. " 21 
In August, 1872 the College of Harvard University ap-
pointed James as. instructor to conduct three exercises a week 
19Henry James, op. cit., 130-31. 
~£Lette rs, Vol., I, 126. 
Ioid,, 152. 
16 
tea ching comparative anatomy and physiology. So he und ertook 
to teach a subject which, though congenial and intere sting, lay 
distinctly off the path of his deepest inclination. 
17 
i· 
I 
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2. AS Psychologist . 
The physiological s tudies of James were prosecuted a c-
cording to a strictly experimental method. This disposition t 
t ake experience as the surest guide led the physiologist in-
to the domain of psychic research . By long and. patient experi 
ments on a physiological ba sis he eventually raised objections 
' to the analogy between physical ana psycho logical exper ience: 
i f a fr og is deprived. of its h i ghex• centers the react ions 
becorae s pont aneous . Having learr ed from p~as s iz to consult 
nature, to t aKe facts from it ane1 to consider these facts 
Vd l liam James became a scholar of s tr ic tly experimental me t hod. ! 
~ith experience as his s ole guide he began psychologic resear c 
with the help of the biologic a l and physical sciences. By 
reciprocity, t b..rough psych olog y, the physical sciences will be 
1 transfm•med.: the material ele,nent will disappear and t heir 
II 
II 
rigid ity wil l be sr.aothere d . This p sychology r..Loes not resemble 
the trad.i tional mental science but it is ratlJ.er a n e w and 
revolut~ ionary way of physiological p sychology wnich became a 
laboratory science through studying medicin e and tea c hing its 
secr•ets; Vd lliam James was obviously extending h is range of 
interests. He reported h i H1self as attending philosophical 
lectures by Charles Pe irce and d isc us s i ng philosophica l pro -
blems. To a depres sed friend Jame s recoLrun ended 1~Iarcus 
Aureli s as a h elp which h e h iJ!lself received from it. 
18 
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However strongly inclined toward the problems of the Universe 
he went first through a mediate period. In search for health, 
in Europe, he also studied. He came into contact with Helm-
holtz, Virchow, and Bernard, the p owel'ful German personalities 
of that time. At that period (1867-1868), he was convinced 
that nthe time has come for psychology to begin to be a 
science." 22 Late r on, however, William James will say that his 
work: in 'J . psychology was not due to J • . des ire but rather to 
na sort of fat a lityi 11 
I orig inally studied medicine in order to be a p~y­
siologist, but I drlfted into psychology and phllos-
ophy from a sort of fat a lity . I never had a ny philo-
sophic instruction, the first lecture on ~sychology 
I ever he a rd being the first I ever gave.23 
The doctrine in honor at tha·t time was associationism: 
an effort to find, in the d omain -of consciousness, an associa-
tion of the two. But V!illiam J ames rose against such a doc-
trine a s a vigorous and successful adversary. He showed how 
the psychic life is by its e lf a truly specific and original 
quality. Introspection must be the best and the necessary 
method for psychology and the true introspection, according to 
Jame s, is to be found tn the synthesis of the t wo methods. 
For him, the subject of psychology is the life of personal con-
sciousness and this life is tel e ological--means aiming to 
re a lization of ends, a nd the aim is the preservation of 
2~Letters, Vol. I, 118. 
2°Lettre in~dite, 1-mg. 16, 1902. Quoted by .A;, Menard, A.nalyse 
· et Critique de~ Princi:ees _de l~I:_~chologie de h . J ames, 5. 
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interes ting parts and elLnination of the others . This is a 
mere glimpse of vvhat is presented in The Principles of Psychol -
QEX, a scientific work expounding ps ycholog y as a natural 
sc ienc e . .James dedicated. The Principles of Psych ology to 
Fran~ois Pillon who , writing about .James says: 
C'est une contribution import'f?te a }a psycholog ie 
positive , gue 111. Vl . Jame s 1f d.ebarassee, par sa 
cri tigue d~ c isive de l a theorie de ula ine d.e Biran 
d ' a~res laguelle le sentiment de 1 1 effort nous 
rbv a l erait 2¥ne r~alit! obje ctive , ind~pendante de nous-memes 
In this field, as every,Nhere, .James is original. He is 
the author of one of the most celebr•ated tiiEillrie·~ showing tha t 
from stimula tions a flood of s ensations occurs and this complex 1 
of sens ations is the emotion. 25 Accor•ding to this theory we can-
not say tha t we tremble because we are afr a id, nor that we weep 
because we are ·s ad , but we must say that we are afr a id because 
we tremble and that we are sad because we weep. Thus .James 
affirms that we cannot imagine what woul d remain of emotion if 
. 26 
we eliminated the totality of concomi tant . 
ioilliam J ames 1 s psychology is characterized in his deal-
ing s vv i th religious experience •27 r.rhrough the study of personal 
consciousness certa i n alterations of personality oc cur especia~ 
ly in religious life. I t is these a lterations that were 
24pierre La rousse, Grand Dictionnaire Univers a l, Se cond sup. 
25 William J ames , Th8Pr.inciples of Ps ychology. Vol. II, XXV. 
26This the or y i s known a s the J ames -Lange theory. 
27see especially chap ter VIII on 11 The Devided Self, and the 
Process of its Un i fication. " 
20 
directly studied by James in a sort of religious psychology 
fully treated in The Varieties of Religious Experience, a tre-
mend.ous work published in 1902. The year before •dlliam James 
had been appointed as Gifford Lecturer on Natural Religion at 
the University of Edinburgh . In t wenty lectures, vrhich make up 
the book, he gives a descriptive expos-ition of what man's re-
1ligious appetites are ; a psychology and philosophy of religi on 
related to its manifold processes experienced in human con-
sciousness . ; The religious soul having introduced an element 
of d.i v ersi ty, an extra normal ps ychology is produced: that is 
what James ackno wledges and expounds as a distinct kind of ex-
perience which he calls reli gious. According to James, the 
faculty of entering into co1rununication with other consciousness-
! es is the psychic basis of religious life. The individual ex-
periences religious emotions :leading ~ him rtb great and noble 
capacities of which he was incapa ble before. 'rhe human con-
sciousness is endo we d with the conviction of communicating with 
God as well as with other consciousnesses. The fixity of laws 
and of the rigidity of matter is not real but merely apparent 
for there is the stream of consciousness: 
28 
Sous les consciences, s~par~es entre elles, des 
individus, il y a la penetration mutuelle des 
consc1ences 1 coexistant avec leur individualit~ dans la sphere du spirituel et du divin .28 
· Emile Boutroux, William James, 64 . 
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The problem of magnetism which physiolo gy rejected, 
science d.isrega rd.ad, and medicine ti'ea ted as af'fe ct s of' the 
imagina t ion, Wil],.iam J ames called. a real phenomenon knmvn of 
all times, and therefoi'e, woi'thy of ps ychic investigation and 
me tho dica l reseai'ch. 
No mattei' where you open its pages , you find 
things recorded under the name of divinations, 
inspira tions, demoni a ca l possessions, appari-
tions, trru~ces, ecstasies, miraculous healings, 
and productions of disease, and occult powers 
posessed by peculiar individuals over persons 
and thing s in their nei ghborhood.29 
11 little further he affirms tha t when in a psychology, 
physiology, a nd medicine, a debate arises between these scien-
tists and the mystics generally the latter have been found to 
be right about the facts--the scientists about the theories. 
The reception of James'spsychology through the world has 
1 been exceptionally enthusiastic and its· success considerable. By 
advancing science into the field of personality he made a gre a t 
step for vvard leaving far behind the old tradition. There can 
be no doubt tha t European way s of thinking dominated in him; 
his psychological work is almost entirely based upon early in-
fluences plus himself. He a t once stepped into the front rank 
of ps ychologists as a leader of the school. By the brilliance 
of his analogies and the freshness of his inimitable style, 
(due in part proba bly to h is f amilia rity with Ger man and French) 
29 
Viilli am J ames, The ·· 111 to _Believe, 300. 
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William J i:ll1leS gained ~- - rapid popularity. As early a s 1889 he 
attended the International Congress of Physiological Psychology 
in Paris, and was chosen to ppen the Congress. 30 
J ames has exsrcised a potent influence in Europe as v1ell 
as America and his work is especially significant in the field 
of analytical psychology in which he has had fe w e quals. He 
was a mas t er of introspection and ob serva tion; his insi ght into 
human na ture h a s probably not been surpassed, and his Varieties 
of Religious Experience opened up a psychological .a pproa ch to 
reli gion tha t has led to significant developments. 
In spite of the f a ct above stated of J ames's crea tion of 
the first psycholog ical laboratory in the Ne w Continent, he h a d 
lan aversion to laboratory 
lfi tted for such studies. 
work and never thought himself well 
Thus, a fter• having completed the 
Psychology, he lost interest in the sub!ject preferring the · 
freedom of adventure, observat ion, and reflection. The na ture 
and existence of God, the riddle of t he universe, the problem,· 
of freedom or of the immortality of the soul began to grow in 
a precise form and made J ames s ay tha t compared to these pro-
blems, ps ychology seemed to him 11 a n a sty little subjectll vmich he ·a s 
no w le aving entirely aside and t hat without re gret. 
In fa ct t h is is just what he also did conce r ning physiology 
which he left i n order to g o for vvard in a me t aph ysica l field. 
30 
c. H. Grattan, op. cit., 137. 
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I almost feel myself this moment tha t were I to 
produce a frog and put him through his physio-
logical performances in a masterly manner before I 
your eyes, I should gain more reverential ears... I 
I \vill not ask whether there be not some thing of I 
mer e fashion in t his presti ge whi%~ t he words of 
Thus, ag::: ,p::·::::g~::: ::j::m::~: 1:::: the strong tendencies I 
I to ward philosophy reaw~· In the pr ·efa ce of The Princip:j_es of 
Psycholg_gx, he excuses himself because 11 some of the chapters 
are more ' metaphysical' ••• than is suitab le.'·' 32 This book is 
filled not only with the subject he should have written about 
but with n a mass o_f descriptive details, running out in to 
I queries which only a me taphys lcs ••• can hope successfully to de al l 
with. 1133 
Individualism was a notion of fundamental import ance- with 
James. Because of the "certain blindness in human beings 11 he 
was led to consider all sorts of points of vie vvs to arr ive at thel 
I 
notion of' the impossibility of a universe appearing a s an abso-
34 
lute,single fact. So, even his psychology led him, somehow, 
to his concept of a pluralistic universe. 
31william Jlli11es, The Will to Believe, 112. 
32vol. I, v. 
33Ibid.., VII. 
34c. H. ~ra~tan, op cit 149 
'-A v • • ' • 
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3. As Philosopher 
Ne w England thinking was mostly represented by trans-
cendentalism, and v•·illiarn James translated it into a philo-
sophical language. If J~nes attended many schools, none in-
fluenced his life as the sahool of his ovm home where he was 
given free rein to follow the bent of his o1<m interest a nd where 
he used to take part in the discussions ana debates of the home 
often times used as a forum. His f a ther 1 s. philosophical ideas 
were centered in religious and moral problems. Having studied 
at Princeton Theological Seminary for two years (1835-1837) at 
that critical perioa offuecay of the orthodox system Henry James 
Sr. embarked upon an independent search for a suitable philos-
ophy. He 1Jvrote a good deal on different topics and lectured 
much. Henry James 1:! charoacteristic notion was that without a 
profound idea of the reality of evil, one could not become a 
relig ious thinker. "James is a very good fellow, better and 
better as we see him moroe 11 , wrote Carlyle to Emerson on 
November 17, 1843. 
Swendenborg's philosophy(Vmdlc ontributed to the formation 
of the romant ic mind) influenced 1lilliam James 1s father who was 
intensely interested in such a relig ious kind of think ing. In 
Swe naenborg 1 s works Henry James found his truth and never 
travelled without carroying his works. For h is writings he re-
lied only on the works of Swendenborg from which he dE!~iued the 
greatest part of his inspiration. Some important books of his 
25 
- --
are: The Nature of Evil (1855), 'l'he Church of Gi:lrist not an 
Ecclesiastici s m (1856), Christianity , t ne Logic uf Creation 
·------
(1857). J ames be lieved th a t the final v alue of Protes -Gant ism 
was i ts c ontr•ibut ion to the d isaggregation of Catholic i s m and 
t hat t he aband.o mnent of ace le s i a s t ic a 1 organiz a tions v. ould be 
anothe r for ward step . Wnile he never haa a c hurch a 11 h is 
phi losophy is in tirnate ly wov en with l ibe1., a l theology . 35 
These retrospective lines sn ow what k ind of s c ho ol ·the 
Jame s household. 'lvas . 'l'ha·t \·iilliam James 'IJvr•ote much on t h e re-
l i g iou si de, is , ac cording ly, n ot surpr is ing . In 'che year 
1896 appeared. The Vd ll to Believe, anei four years late1., The 
Varieties of Religious Expe rience. 
The views of Wil liam J au1e s were d irected towarJ. plui•a lis-
t ic metaphysics but h is radicalism an:.l i ndiviuual isla did. not 
take place at the beginning of h is philosophical caree1.,. n. t 
the outset Jarn.es attempted to find in the phenomena of re-
ligious experience an evidence for extra h u man activity . His 
biological, psychological, and philosophical empiricism do not 
stand a lone: a religious mysticism flashes through most of 
36 
his V.Jri tings and especially through t:;he two menttoned a bove. 
Even if we a dmit tha t there was a 11 conflic t 11 between h is 
mysticism and his s cient:ti'ic tendencies; even if 
~~c . JI. Gr•attan, oo. c:Lt., 25-95. 
Th.e tendency of ~~illi a.m J ames ' s commenta tors to i gnore his 
relig ious phllosophy or at least to separ•ate it fro:-n h is 
thoughts as a whole, is unfair; to crl tic ize is f a irer than 
to r eject " a priori " • 
26 
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the mystical Swedenborgian piety of h is father had--according 
to many--a regrettable influence 0 11 an otherwise brilliant 
mind; imp a rtiality obliges us to affirm that James's mystical 
11 germ 11 a s he c a lled it, was not repugnant to him. 
If he kne w very ka enly the powei' of the will to live and 
to believe ; if he went :rin quest of v a lue and creative ability 
of the human spirit, he also 
mysticism . In The Varieties 
longed for peace and religious I 
of Religious Experi enc e , he quotes 
freely Saint Francois de Sales, Saint Teresa, Thomas A. -KEiL1Ipis; 
he compares .lVlarcus Aurelius's writings to the 11 C.:hi'istian warmtr. 
of sentiment 11 • He is so intensely int erested in the detail of 
relig ion that , at time~,it is difficult t o think of William 
James as the au thor . Methodism, l'iloravians , Luther ~s ; , Catho-
lies, Quakers, Puritans, and o thers are quoted. i<lahomet has 
his place as well as Mrs . Eddy ! Religion at time s has been 
the"summum bonumuof his some wh at desperate re s ear c h of a rest-
ing ground while 11 powerlessnessn, 11 decaying a nd failing 11 and 
even 11 irremediable impotence 11 , seem to have the pre'eminence. 37 
\ll~he n VII'i ting about James, a captain circumspection, s eems 
·i mp e ra tive .. b efore asse rting too soon what he thinks 
or what he believes. Commentaries or quo tations should at 
least follo w affirmative statements such a s 11 the charming and 
rich humanism of William James 11 found in a modern wr iter. 38 
~Zsee specially Lectures I X and X. 
Ot)H . G. To wnsend, Philosophical Ideas in the United States, 1 03 
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If it is u nde rstood that human ism is a ph i losophical c oncept;ion 
of relig ion a s " the highest enti ty so far atta ined11 h ow can 1 t 
be saia. tha t James was a huJ.ID.nlst wi thoui:i misinterpl~ eting i·1 
part his r e l i g ious concept. Yor he himself writes t hat "we are 
s uch he lp less failures in the 1ast resort. 'l'he s anes t and. 
of u s are of one clay with lunatics and rison inma tes, and 
39 deat..IJ. finally run s the most robust of us clown .. " 
Ja raes b e lieved in God and the k in:.:L of Dei t y i n which h e 
believed. is c lase ly related vvi th t he developsaent Of h is c on-
caption of truth . F'rom t h e above q.1. otation 1 s seen that h e 
is t r·ying to find a way be t ween reltgion and ;no ral. ism. An 
act ·tve pluralis,u. sha l l take away, l ater, t h ese 11h elp le ss 
failurestt . J ames, I ven.tUJ:>e to s ay , was himself an illustra-
tion of evolut ion; fo r his God at twenty is totally different 
from that of hi s ye a:~.~s and h is views of everyth i ng ape con-
stant ly ev olving toward a p luralistic concept. The s tarting 
point i s, h owever, worth citing i f the contrast me ntioned is 
to be f ul ly g rasped . Speal{i ng of' _h i .ns elf h e state s ~ " The 
universe was changed for Jae al toge ther." He could. n ot be 
s ati sfied wi t h a t a.t ic universe and. long before affir ming h is 
mature bel ief and. t h e definite vi ew of hi w vvor lci the problem b.e 
f elt.. As to the i de a of his God the s a.11e lett-er g ives tne pr)rl 
i d e a of the later advocate of Hadic -':l.l b!np il~icis ,n a nd of the 
t h eory of t11.e f -lnit e God . 
~1!-i lliam James, Tne varieti es at' Rel i_gious .ii~el~iences, 47 . 
1 28 
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Passing t hrough deep experiences attributed to 11 a religious 
bearing 11 J ames's fear v1a s great so great says he, 11 that if I 
had not clung to scripture-texts like 'The eternal God is my 
refuge', etc., 'Come unto me , all ye that l abor and are he avy-
laden', etc. , 1 I am the resurrection and the life!~ etc., I 
think I should have grown really insane. 11 40 
This seems to be the best hymn of the 11 sick soul 11 but 
James knows also that 11heal tP.y-rn indedne s s " will fi ght . .:.. 
battles in ordel' to pass from the contemplative to the a ctive. 
The hymn of escape. He a lthy-mindedness will find its way out 
of the 11 All-in-1.;.ll 11 with its monistic and pantheistic ten-
dencies and become frankly pluralistic. 
This is a"mind-cure 11 fo1• Hegelian monism, rationalism, and ! 
:: it made . v·/. Jame.s . .. c "the champion of a perfectly definite con- I 
ception of the metaphysical struc ture of the world. n 41 The 
evil which, like everything else, must have its foundation in 
God u:derthe monistic view, creates a too great difficulty if 
God is to be thought of as absolutely good. The only vmy to 
escape lies in the notion that there are "elements of the uni-
verse which may make no l'ational whole in conjunction with the 
other elements, a nd which ••• can only be considered so much 
irrelevance and accid.ent ••• n42 
~~ ~~illiarn Jam~ s, Ibid., 161 ( Cf. Letters, Vol. I, 145.) 
;illiam Jamvs, Ibid., 133. 
42Loc. cit., 1 33. 
I 
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Is is obvioustha t elements separ ated from the whole are 
nothing less than a further and r ap id advance toward a not yet 
exploded term which in fact is a pluralistic universe. Thus, 
evolving from a pessimistic view to an optimistic one, the I · 
"sick soul 11 not yet fully satisfied pleads for the 11 peace of 
rationa li ty 11 • An inextricab le ~i.lemma, apanage of all human 
being , s eems to h ave been intensely a cute for J ames. 11 A God 
who saves is impossib le, · yet a God vvho saves is necess a ry. n43 
James's thought was stimulated by a pa ssion for kno·wledge 
and for truth. He took and collected as much data as possible 
in ord er to s t udy and define human experience. Throughout his 
career as a philosopher he was filled with passion and ~n-
,J-
thusi a sm~confident :b£ a future to which each eff ort b:Gl-l l;ts ' ~ ; . 
to cre a te and i mprove. The concrete , the f a cts were his field 
of incursions for there, and th ere only the reality and life of 
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thing s v;a s going to be found. He fought a nd found freedom 
for h i mself; he is first of all his own CI•itic and ·cveJ;>.comes the 
barriers of a determined life: he knows how to start by a rt, 
continue by physiology, go ahead in ps ychology, and culmina te 
in philosophy. He kno -ws how to g o from qogma to f a ct, from 
rationalism to empiricism, and from monism to pluralism. He 
is big enough to aclcnowledge as invalid what he has once pre-
sented as sound, pa ssing from a first accepted concept to its 
~~s. Bixler, Re li~ion in the Philosophy of ~m . James, 15. 
44 Th. Flournoy, Tnenilosopny of' Vill.LJ.am James, 23. 
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criticd.sm and fighting a great battle fOl"' lioerat ion. Ri sing 
against absolutism, he will remain a personal a nd admired 
friend of his opponents; fighting theories but loving theor:eti-
cians seems to be the basic principle of his perfect courtesy. 
Once he was resting on scientific data through the beginning 
of his career and later he lay great stress on its limitation 
affirming its value merely as a 11 method of knowing rather than 
45 
a content of knowledge. 11 
Through the influence of the theOl"'ies. of Darwii'l:, he will 
assim·rilate the freedom received from Renouvier and through the 
influence of Peirce science will be viewed a s a method; Berg-
son and :B'echner, whose direct influences shall be given at 
length , led James, this great adventurer, to become a pioneer. I 
Th · h f -·.- · 11· J ill b i t d · · t'l... *~ I us, -c e name o vn J.illn ames w e assoc a e 'Yi. l J...!._ ~.1e 
birth of a ne w philosophical era; it 1:. vv~l l ma rk the starting 
point of modern philosophy for the think.ers of the t wenty-
first century. 
45Horace 1Vl . Kallen, The Philosonhy of William James, 37. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Throughout my long and careful study of \'Jilliam J arn.e s 's 
thought , one thing has greatly i mpressed me , namely, first 
that he -vvas ahead of his time and second, tha t he qas quick 
to receive and welcor.:1e every ne w idea in •Nhich he could find 
some light. He was a lso an enthusiast caring not if a new 
idea origi nated b y him was taken by others or vice vers a . His 
great openmindness h ad no CQTICe:rm. for personal prestige. What 
he received from others he frankly acknowledge s as such . 
He re the writer hopes tha t no trace of prejudice or 
11 chauvinisme 11 have influenced h is pen in presenting the French 
i nfluen ces exerted upon the Amer ican thinker. 
The origi n of three--among many--of James ts'. tendencies 
vvi ll be here pi•esented. The fi rs t will bear on the beginning 
of pluralism through the i nfluences of Renouvier; the second 
presenting the start and development of ·J ames critique of in-
tellec tualism through the influences of Bex•gson, t he third 
sha ll i ntroduce a ne w way of re a son ing as well a s the concept 
of a limited God due to the influences of Pechner . Thus sh ow-
ing--in spi te of the probable inverse i mpr ession--tha t James 
v;as grea t in tha t he was an innovator and a creator~ :Sh aring 
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with Lang e, Renouvier, Bergson , and probably many others, 
what are· nowadays considere d c re a l discoveries and the ba sic 
principles for some tendencies in actual .Amer•ican thought. 
A. Renouvier 1 s Influences. 
1. The First Contact, Preedom 
If any one writer has had a gre a t influence on \ illiam 
James tha t thinker is Charles Renouvier. At th~ time Vvne:h 
J ames went through a difficult p eriod of physical and mental 
disturbances, Renouvier appe ars in his life as giving both 
a ne w direction to his views of life and a vi tal impulse to-
ward a nevv field · of thinking. The acquaintance with Renouvier I 
is also a focal point in James's personal and intellectual his- · 
tory. Through his long months and ye ars of illness in which 
he lived partly in a st a te of semi-invalidism rnixed with a 
sort of phobic p anic, his relief came--according to his own 
statement--fr o~ .· re ading Charles Renouvier on free will. 
Freedom is a real event when one is in a sta te of ph:tlosophic 
pessimism and general depression of spirit,.and:.vnen the idea or 
the f a ct of being left alone with one's self cannot occur 
without thoughts and experiences of melancholia. 
VJhat cured James was not medicine but a psychological 
rein tegra tion; a new view of the world and of life; a new 
attitude thi•ough v1hich he will attain to his philosophy. The 
fixed and pre-established way of thinking brought over from 
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Europe by the pilgrims and all emi gr ants was still very strong 
among American people and .~erican thinkers. Through the in-
flue nee of an European philosopher, however, James, and p artly 
through him, 1-Unerican idealism will throw off the ideas of 
predestination, foreordination, a nd the like. Freedom, risk, 
effort, novelty by no means fixed in adv a nce, will tak e the 
' 
I 
place of the classical beliefs . lvian will be no moPe shut into I 
' I a finishe d universe where there is nothing to do or nothing I 
I 
I 
I 
to cha nge and to improve. 
This theory of the freedom of the will so de a r to the 
f\...merican thinker, James o wed to Charles Renouvier. In an 
article found in La Critique PhilosoP.higue written in P r e nch 
by James himself he s a ys: 
lv'ie s propres id~es (sur l a th~orie de la volent~) se 
sont formees bien posterieurement, pa r l a lecture 
de votr e ouvra ge et de ce l ui de Lotze; de s orte 
que je n'ai sur ce poin t n i independa nce ni ori-
ginalit~ quelbonque.l _ 
'l1hus his revolutiona ry tendencies seem to have received 
a d efinite propulsion from this starting point of freedom pro-
cl a i med by the French thinker. But it was J ames tha t dis-
covered Renouvier; more than a ny other he contributed to t h e 
r e cog nition and perpetration of Renouvier 1 s wor k a • . To f i n d 
in others a light that nobody else c a n see is to be someho w a 
p a rtaker in t he discovery . 
lLa Cri t i que Philosophi que, 4eme ann ee, II,JB88, 401-404. 
34 
As eet.rly a s 1868 J ame s tells his father of his first 
ac qua i ntance vii th Henouvier' s vwi ting s . A cert a in 
little book ••• by one Charles Henouvier, of 
whom I never heard before but who, for vi gor 
of style a nd compression, going to the core 
of half a d ozen things in a sing le sentence, 
so different from the namby-parnby diffusernents 
of mos t Prenchrnan , is une qu a lled by anyone . 2 
The philosophy of Char les Bernard Renouvier is inde pen-
dent as to the tr a dition and the conservat ive tendencies and 
we shall see further why it appealed so much to t he great pro-
fessor of Cambridg e. 
).bout t vm ye a rs a fter• he wrote the letter above quoted, 
unde r the date of April 30 i 1 870, J ames spe a ks again of a new 
step t aken hy; b. :tm~ 
I think tha t yesterday was a crisis in my life . 
I finished the firs t p a rt of Henouviel' ' s second 
11
.Essais 11 and see no reason why his definition 
of Free iidll-- 11 '-Ine sus taining of a thou.ght 
because I choose to when I might have other 
t h ough ts 1' need be the definition of an illusion ••• 
~y first a ct of fr e e will shall be to believe 
in free will ••• Now, I will g o a step further 
with illY . will, not only act vdth it, but believe 
as 'Nell; belie v~ in my iniividual reality a nd. 
cre at ive povver. 0 
The critique of scien tific kno wledge by a man h i ghly 
trained in mathematics, opened a new field for J ames; a field 
of hope to t ake the pla ce of pessimistic tendencies; a field of 
confi dence in the free a ct of personalitie s by pointing out 
Z'"viilliam James, Letters, Vol. I, 1 38 . 
3op. cit., 147. 
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t he limitat ions of nature and sci entific kno vvledg e. Here 
a gai n J ames finds a g ood remedy b oth for his mental illness 
I 
and h is bounded thoughts in the F'rench 11 neo-criticisme". 
I 
I 
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It mus t be clearly stated the.t Willia m J ames was never I 
a full discip l e of Renouvier. ·v'Jha t J a mes openly a ckn o vvl edges 
is that he owes to h im a n intellig i b le a nd reasonab l e concep -
t ion of free d om. 11 Gr~ce b. vou s 11 , he ·wrote to the F'l~ench 
thi nker on November 2, 1872, 11 je poss~de pour l a premiere fois 
une co n cep t ion intellig i b l e et ro.ls onable de l a liberte 11 ~ 
Still later (1876) The Na tion publish ed a n article in 
whi ch J a me s exh i bits h is f a vOl"a ble re a ctions and purpose to 
give n g reater reli e f to the merits .of a F' r ench philosopher , 
Renouvier ••• who has given to the philosophy ••• a f orm in our I 
opinion far more cle ar, perfect, and co ns istent than ha s been 
att a i ned by any .Eng l i sh V.'l"iter"~ \Jhat, to J ames, is greater 
in Renouvier than in any English thinkel" is due pa rtly to 
Renouvier 1 s gre a t 
Bmphasis t o the l aws of group ing as t o the phe -
nomena g rouped . ~~e l aws ar e for him equally 
with phenomena absolute a nd distinct . In fact, 
a ' phenomenon ' a p art from its group , l aw or 
f unct ion i s an i nc onceivab l e non-entity .e 
Surel y J ame s wa s adv ancing on a ne w -vvay wh en accepting 
Renouvier 1 s st a tements tha t certi tude is 11 n othing but be l lef 11 
4op . c it ., 1 63 . 
5Coll e cteQ E ss ay s a nd Reviews, 27. 
6 . t 29 op • c l • , • 
and that of letting freedo m "pronounce on its ovm real 
existence. 11 
2. 'Ihe First Steps 'I'o ward Plur a lis m. 
It may be well to state here that J amBs is. already l ean-
ing from monism to vvard pluralism. A shade of' it is found in 
his statement that Chal~les Renouvier is "the greatest living 
i nsister on the principle that unity in ou1~ account of thing s 
shall not overwhelm cle ax•ness." 7 Further do wn, j_n the same 
article , James states more definitely that "a plurality of 
·categ ories and an i nrmens e number of primordial entities ••• is 
the minimwn of philosophi c baggage , the only possible compro-
mise betvveen the need of clearness and the need of uni tyn 8 
r.illiam J ames made several r•eviews of Renouvier's worlcs; 
he shared with the founder of French phenomenalism a mutual 
frisndship a nd admiration . Yvhat is made clear in James ts 
praises is t hat through l audatory vvr:t t ings concerning Renouvie 
he found the opportunity to expound a new vmy of thinking 
which he , himself adopted. In an art icle for ~he Philosophic 
Rev ievi ( 1893 ) he WI'i tes: 
••• the philosophy of the future will have to 
be that either of Renouvier or of Hegel. They 
represent the radica l extremes ••• bither hold 
f a st with Renouvier, to the principles of 
identity, contradiction, and excluded middle 
abso lutely , and then !'egard the vmr l::i as a 
'?collected Essays and Heviews, 98. 
s ib i::i ., 119-120. 
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bundle, an irre ::luci b l e plura lism of d.a ta r ela ted 
by defin ite laws or insist v.i.th Hegel that a more 
universal tmi ty than that of mere 'law1 ·,veav e s 
a ll this manifold. togethe r •.• and deny of every 
datum that it is in truth the individual existence 
which it seems. Clea rness a nd consistency, with 
irremedi able dis continuity and pluralisr.l , or ••• 
unity without cle a rness or consistency ••• such 
is the dilemma which it is Renouvier 1 s great mer it 
to h ave made sharp er Q.nd more exp l i cit t han i t 
ever was made before.~ 
3 . The Common Vie ws of 'l'he ir Philosophy. 
The philosophy of Charles Renouvier is phenomenalis t ic, 
p l uralistic, fr eed a nistic, f inal istic, melioristic, a nd 
the istic. Henouvier was s tanding for ide a listic empir•icism 
a nd the istic pluralism. The free dom , the will, the freedom of 
the will, the emphasis of the indivi dua l and of values found 
in Renouvier ' s vvr iting s, were of great a ttraction to the Amer-
' 
lean professor in search : o~ an adequate system of thought 
wi th which he could agree . By giving a summa ry of the views 
of the French neo-crltical personalist it will be made cle a r 
both wna t appealed to James and the reasons of his indebted-
ness. 
Renouvier repudiates all absolutes and considers r eality 
as a mere representation; r•eali ty is phenorrienal. He accepts , 
as over Hegel, the principle of contradiction and excluded 
middle. r:~. ssex•ting the re a l:i.ty of freedom he repudiates the 
concept of the completed or actual infinite. hhile monism 
~---------------9rrhe Philosophical Heview, 2 {1893), 213. 
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and continuity are in 11 Viogue 11 H. enouvier• asserts pluralism and 
.dis continuity. 11 Le monisme a pour inv a riable compagnon le 
d~terminisme, 11 says Renouvier; a s to pluralism he adds: 11 1v1a 
conscience pr~f~re cet individu miserable ~ toute la f anta s-
mag .orie des monismes. nlO 
AS before stated in other words belief is considered to be 
the organ of truth and reason is someho w identified with the 
real, and the v alue of science is presented as limited ·while 
evolution is repudiated: 
'lne onslaughts which this eminently clear-headed 
writer has made and still makes ••• on the vanity 
of the evolutionary principle of simplification, 
which supposes th at you h a ve expl a ined away. all 
distinctions by simply saying 11 they a rise 11 in-
stead of 11 they are 11 , fo1~1n the gblest criticfrm 
which the school of evolution has r eceived. · 
Renouvier affirms a lso the personality of God, and hence 
his finiteness , just as the world , Cl"eated by God, is finite 
in time . He believed in immort a li t y for men and in the re a lity 
of evil--disharmony in the world. 
Knowing tha t Willi am J ames was a n empiricist, a sensa-
ti ona lis t , a plux•a list, a free- willist, and religious, ( among 
other characteri sties) the common element s found i n the philo-
sophical systems of both of them are very prominent. Most 
certainly it is to these common views that J ames refers when he 
lOcharles Renouvier, Esguiss e d 1 une classification systemati -
que, II, 241. 
llCollected Essays and Reviews , 98. 
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-states : that without Renouvier 1 s help he might not have ar-
rived at a pluralistic concept of the universe. 
It may be true then that the great American tendency of 
modern idealism has found some of its roots in the philosophy 
of Charles Renouvier, that great creative thinker of' the last 
century with whom William James shared pluralism, phenomena-
lism, panspsychism, an<~ unfinished world, anti ... scientism and 
anti-intellectualism; theism and the theory of a finite God; 
meliorism; the reality of' evil and possibility of progress. 
Concerning acti'tzi ty, freedom, and the will, James says: u I 
owe all my doctrines on this subject to Renouvier."12 
"La volonte de croire" is, it is true a phrase much used 
by Ranouvier13and what James wrote of' the French thinker as 
early as 1868 he acknowledges again after almost thirty years 
of experience. On August 4, 1896, in a letter addressed to 
Renouvier James says: 
I sent you a nNew World" ••• with an article in 
it called "The Will to Believa, 11 in which (if 
you took the trouble to glance at it) you probably 
recognized how completely I am still your disciple. 14 
The posthumous work of William James entitled ome Problems 
of Philosophy, was dedicated to Charles Renouvier. This was 
12william James, A Pluralistic Universe, Appendix B, 391. 
13See: Esguisse d'l+n.e classification syst. des doctrines 
philosophiquas, II, 315. 
14william James, Letters, V6l. ' II, 44. 
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done in accordance with James's express wish who left on 
record the following statement: 
••• he (Charles Renouvier) was one of the greatest 
of philosophic characters, and but for the de-
cisive impression made on me ••• by his masterly 
advocacy of pluralism, I might never have got 
free from the monisticsuperstition under which I 
had grown up. 15 
B. Bergson's Influences. 
1. James's Interpretation of Bergson. 
As strange as it may seem William James has ttei•ived many 
of his theories fr.om .. ::·t- . modern foreign influences. If he !~new, 
admired, and studied Renouvier while he was still ignored so 
ne.equany for Bergson. To discover in others what is valuable 
for him and for the world of thought is a part of William 
James's genius. 
Now following Bergson, as well as Renouvier, James is 
opposed to every static concept of reality. Like Bergson he 
stands firmly for genuine freedom and continuous creation in 
a flowing world: the inward experience of the stream of con-
sciousness is leading toward more truth. The static absolute 
is at first di9regarded, then criticized, and finally de-
liberately rejected. 
Walter B. Witkin, in an article on "James and Bergson"l6 
15william James, Some Problems of Philosophy, Foreword. 
16The Journal of Phil., 7{:1909), 225. 
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tries to differentiate the two thinkers as having less in com- I 
man than is generally believed. Fitkin shows that Where 1 
Bergson presents life as transcending experience, James "thinks \ 
only of experience as transcending conceptual thinking." That, , 
he affirms, is a fundamental difference of point of view in j 
i 
the two philosophies. In his severe criticism directed against \ 
j James, he claims that the philosophy of Bergson is entirely 
different from the radical empiricism presented by James. He 
goes so far as to say that in his A Pluralistic Universe James 1 
1 has altogether misinterpreted the thoughts and theories of the I 
I 
French professor. But the 18th of May, 1910, Henri Bergson 1 
signed an artlela for The Journal of PhilosoRh~ entltl~d: I 
"A Propos d'un Article de Mr. Walter B. Pitkin Intitule: 'James 1 
I 
:::u::::•o::~:so~:::t::9c:::::;·t::t w::t::l::t~::e:~: :::e::d I 
pre ta tion of his theories as perfe.ctly correct and remarkably I 
expounded. The article, it is true, is rather devoted to state ! 
some misunderstandings and misinterpretations of Pitkin than 
to prove the analogy that Pitkin denies. Nevertheless Bergson 
ends by saying: "Mr. William James n'a voulu .exposer, et n'a 
dt\clar~ prendre ! ., son compte, qu'une certaina th~wrie des 
concepts ••• .sur tout , cela il a di t exactement ee que je 
pensa. 11 17 
1_..,.... ___ _ 
l7The Journal of Phil., 7 (1910), 388. 
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The chapter criticized by Pitkin but Vlhieh Bergson praises 
expounds how static concepts and traditional rationalism are 
leading to a static universe. It expounds the theories of 
Bergson and his critique of logic showing its impotence to 
define a universe where change is continuous. And all of this, 
says Bergson, is not only what I meant but is well said, even 
better said than I could have said myself. 
' It may have been noticed that the concept of the "duree 
r$e,l le" of Bergson developed in his Essai sur las donn~es 
' immediates de la conscience, and the description given by James 
of the "stream of consciousness" in his Principles of Psy-
chology, have some bearings. vbat is interesting to know--in 
order to see the coming new tendency of thinking~-is that 
neither knew the work of the other when they were written. 
Bergson speaks of the independence of James and of him he says: 
"Je ne connaissais alors de w. James que ses belles ~tudes sur 
l'~ffort et l'~motion.nl8 
I I Until the publication of Matiere et memoire, it would 
seem, the two thinkers developed their philosophies 
independently, and their unamimity ••• is perhaps 
better to be attributed to the i~ta they studied 
than to reciprocal influencing. 
2. The Revolt Against Intellectualism. 
The main purpose of James in writing his chapter on Berg.,. ·• .. 
son in A Pluralistic Universe is to arrive at a severe criti-
18Revue Philosophitue, 40 {1905)~ 229. 
19a. M. Ka!Hm, WI Iiam James ana. Henri Bergson, 23. 
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cism of intellectualism. The leader of radical empiricism of 
Cambridge finds in Bergson's theory of concepts a confirmation 
of his own views. He says plainly, :aa ·h:e did of Renouviar, 
that it is the philosophy of Bergson that helped him in his 
radical thinking. I "Bergson's philosophy ••• led me personally to 1 
renounce the intellectualistic method and the current notion 
that logic is an adequate measure of what can or cannot be.n20 
Not only James shows his admi~ation of the Bergsonian 
system of thought but he very emphatically presents in a vivid 
form the great contribution of the F1rench thinker to the de-
velopment of thought in a new realm. " ••• a service, 11 says 
James, 11 for mich we may be almost immeasurably grateful ••• who 
ever conferred on us so valuable a freedom before?" 21 ThUB re-
I ceiving freedom in one line from Renouvier and freedom again 
in another realm from Bergson, the great leader of Pragmatism I 
He perceives "Bergson ! exults; his sick soul is for ever cured. 
and the empiricists ••• turn into the valley where the green 
pastures and the clear waters always were. 1122 Being free he 
will become aggressive; a few lines further he adds t ,o the 
former statement: 
As one who calls himself a radical : empiricist, I 
can find no possible excuse for not inclining to-
wards Bergson's side ••• As Kant is supposed to 
~~William James, A Pluralistic Universe, 225. 
Ibid., 339. 
22 11 Bradley or Bergson", The Journal of Phil., 7 (1910), 32-33. 
! 
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I 
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have extinguished all previous f .orms of rationa-
lism, so Bergson ••• might lay post-Kantian rationa-
lism perma nently underground. 23 
Now, as a zealous neophyte, James starts a great fight 
against reason. Logic he repudiates and in order to sustain 
his rather bold claims he is taking to his help the Bergsonian 
doctrine of anti-intellectualism. It has been noticed, how-
ever, that ;'Professor James has found the old logic quite good 
enough to formulate his attack on absolutism and his vindica-
tion of pluralism.n 24 
The intellectualist tendenc -y·,. ; to emphasize the importance 
of reason at the expense of feeling, volition, sensation, and 
intuition is bothering the Cambridge professor. Intellectual-
ists, in ontology, conceive .-, the ultimate nature of reality to 
be some kind of intellig~nce; and the universe as intelligible 
and rational. But James says that "Bergson has refuted their 
pretension to decide what reality can or cannot be. 1125 And, 
since it is Bergson's philosophy that led James personally "to 
renounce the intellectualistic method," 26 he finds through this 
new freedom an open way enabling him to expound his views con-
cerning intellectualism as he understands it. A faculty giving 
us superiority ~ the brutes or, better, a power ~£ translat~ng 
~~Ibid., 33. 
W. P. Montague, " - 'A Pluralistic Universe' and the Logic of 
Irrationalism." The Journal of Phil., 7(1910 
152. 
25A Pluralistic Universe, 216. 
26Ibid., 225. 
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our crude feelings into concepts. This p9wer of creating ab-
stract concepts is the z.enith of the prerogatives of man. 11 We 
come back into the concrete from our journey into these ab-
stractions, with an increase both of vision and of power.u27 
James states also what are the motives of his criticism of 
the intellectualism Which he calls "vicious". This vicious 
type, says James, 11 began when Socrates and Plato taught that 
what a thing really is, is told us by its definition. 1128 The 
habit of using or rather misusing the concepts began when used 
privately and positively. The mistake of logic was to deny 
the possibility of a certain property of a concrete object if 
the definition could not secure the property expected. In 
other v.'O rds, James would say that if a definitiOn fails to com-
pel surrender, it must suppress or negate it. 
3. The Rejection of Reason. 
Good or bad the foreign influences have borne much fruit. 
Vmat seems insoluble, to James, will never be solved by reason. I 
Now James undertakes to undermine and to shake reason at its I 
base. "For my own part," says he, "I have finally found myself 
compelled to give up the logic,29fairly, squarely, and irre-
vocably. 1130 Now doubts are gone, now he dares to be radical 
27 
28Ibid., 217. Ibid., 218. 
29 11Not all logic but the intellectualistic logic of Bradley and 
Ro yce. 11 ( Prof'essor Brightman's note. ) 
30Al~ Pluralis);ic Universe, 212. 
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for himself and to accept the resulting possible consequences. 
The preceding statement of James with its strong emphasis fiQ es 
not Js t and. a lone bu. t :· . seems to be the climax of a much bigger 
step than heretofore. Without any more hesitation he will go 
on through the newly opened highway. nReality, life, ex-
perience, concretness, imrnediacy ••• exceeds our logic ••• u31 
Bergson has taught James that a true reality is above reason, 
that it "transcends logic and is therefore still less rational 
• in the intellectualist sense, so it cannot help us to save our 
logic as an adequate definer and confiner of existence. 1132 
For Bergson the action of the whole personality can only 
be felt and not traced; it is indivisible and unanalyzable. A 
self-intuiting activity becomes the first principle of his 
metaphysics. He declares reality to be sub-rational and pre-
' fers instead a postulate which he calls "elan vital 11 • 
Here is not the place for an exposition of Bergson's 
philosophy, but the few foregoing words may help to connect 
the transformation of James here presented. Now, none will be ' 
surprised at the further statements of James such as: 
If I had not read Bergson, I should probably still 
be blackening endless pages of paper privately ••• 
and trying to discover some mode of conceiving the 
behavior of reality ••• It is certain, at any rate, 
that without the confidence Which . being able to 
31A Pluralistic Universe, 212. 
32Ibid., 213 . 
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lean on Bergson's authority gives me I should 
never have ventured to urge these particular 
views of mine. 33 
~hy such a persisting radical and critical attitude from 
James? Because even radicalism is not an act but a process. 
He did not reject logic at the start but now he goes on 11 giving 
up intellectualism frankly.n34 Step by step ~e arrives at the 
belief that . intellectualism "makes experience less instead of 
more intelligible." 35 Even the thought of a "block universen 
he abhors; "The ruling tradition in philosophy has alwaws been 
the platonic and aristotelian belief that fixity is a nobler 
and worthier th&ng than change." 36 
Ymat then will be the way by which the Cambridge professor 
will prove that such sayings are not so "queer and darkn or 
"childish" as they seem? That is found in a declaration of 
his, thus stated: 
I have now to confess ••• that I should not now be 
emancipated, not now subordinate logic with so 
very light a heart, or throw it out of the deeper 
regions of philosophy to take its rightful and 
respectable place in the world of simple human 
practice, if I had not been influenced P7 a ••• 
french writer, Professor Henr~ Bergson.3 
Logic is overflowed by Reality. Zeno cannot keep Achille 
anymore from catching the tortoise because any moment of 
33Ibid., 214-215. 
34Ibid., 221. 
35Ibid., 234. 
36Ibid., 237. 
37Ibid., 214. 
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experience is other. 38 11 With Bergson's aid," says :Bixle:r:, 
11 James came to see that the conceptual treatment of the flow 
of reality had a practical rather than a speculative value. 1139 
Concepts cut reality into small parts having no resemblance .t . .O 
the original flo w, but a sensible flow of experience, a stream 
of feeling consciousness, '- ~·· · :t s t : ... _ where reality is to be 
found. 
Such statements, if they are true, do not answer the 
question nor take away the boldness of James's stat ements and I 
criticisms. But he has seen already--before anybody else, I 
venture to say--a great authority ~n Bergson and as he studied 
the new systems of thought his own philosophy became sure to 
him and nmore intelligible 11 to others. If James tr.ief;l pa:\nstai1P 
i .ngly to expound the philosophy of Bergson it is only for such 
a purpose. James believed ultimately that the F'rench pi•ofessor 
11has killed intellectualism definitely and without hope of re-
covery".40 Therefore, why should I not, James would say, ac- 1 
cept that as a certainty and reject all of what I am sure to 
be wrong. In other words, he would say that the great blow to I 
rationalism has already been given; he is only the vvitness and 
1
1 
the narrator of a fact already accomplished but to Which--be- I 
cause of its mighty importance--he gives his approval. 
38Ibid., 228-230. 
439Religion in the Philosophy of William James, 33. OA Pluralistic Universe, 215. 
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James appears at all times unsettled. He was constantly 
changing and evolving, unrestingly looking for mor e light and 
more turth. Any kind of truth was light to him and he was al-
ways strong enough to acknowledge his voluntary metamorphosis; 
bold enough also to speak of change when and where h'e . found it 
as well as plurality where the absolute cannot resist. James 
would have challenged heaven.; and hell that the unlverse was 
not static; that is why he says: 
In spite of sceptics and empiricists, in spite of 
Protagoras, Hume, and James Mill, rationalism has 
never been seriously questioned, for its sharpest 
critics have always had a tender place in their 
hearts for it, and have obeyed some of its mandates. 
They have not been consistenj;; they have pla yed 
fast and loose wi,4h the enemy; and Bergson alone 
has been radical. 1 
Like a stormy wind James arrives on the scene of Amel"ican 
Idealism and shakes the tradition. He attacks fearlessly the 
secular belief treating reason as the "sole avenue to truth". 
Rejecting the mature faculties of mind James leads to "the 
possession of reality 11 by the way of "becoming agai n as foolish 
lit tla children in the eyes of reason. 1142 
Toward the end of William James's too short career, 
Renouvier's memory was still the object of his admi ration while 
Bergson was arousing his enthusiasm. The pub.lica :ti,o.n of 
L'Evolution Creatrice, he considered as an important event be-
4lop. cit., 238. 
42op. cit., 273. 
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cause of its new stress o.n a theory by him cherished. To 
F. E. s. Schiller James writes: "It seems to me that nothing 
is important in comparison with that divine. apparition. All 
~positions, real time, a growing world, asserted magis-
terially, and the beast intellectualism killed absolutely 
dead~ n43 Now James is engaged in the war and is proud of it 
for he has found light. To Bergson himself he wrote: 
The vi tal achievement of' the book is that it in-
flicts an irrecoverable de~th-wound upon Intellec-
tualism. It can never ~ Ye suscitatet ••• I feel 
that at bottom we are fighting t~~ same fight, 
you a commander, I in the ranks. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century a more empirical 
philosophy was rising. It sprang up and James discovered it. 
[hrough the influences of Renouvier and Bergson he became a 
champion. Every age .has to construct its philosophy anew and 
William James has already spolcen in behalf of modern American 
th:t:nk~rs . He is ahead of his time. He has carried forth and 
to a farther stage new methods of conceiving the universe. 
Bergson says that beautifully in a single sentence: 
La philosophie a,une,tendance naturelfe a 
vouloir que la verite regarde en arriere: 
pour James ella regarde en a.vant.45 
Yes, this is very rare but James is looking ahead and is · 
travelling on a new road where the men of science--Renouvier 
43The Letters of William James, Vol. II, 290. 
44op. cit.~ 291-292. · 
45Introduc·cion to the French translation of Pragmatism, 10. 
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was a great mathematician; James a physiologist; Bergson a 
biologist--meet acknowledging th.e lhni t a tlons , of :sci€nc2, a road 
where the Hegelian t ype of rationalism ceased to be a competent 
leader. 
James refuses to rationalize the brute aspects of the 
world into an agreeable order; he refuse a to accept the trans-
formation of evil into good, and conflict into harmony by 
means of dialectic. Reality ·is no longer settled by rationali-
zation but events and desires may find harmony according to 
their natures. Reason, James believes, is recognized for what 
it is: a human sentiment and not a cosmic law, or a system, 
or a metaphysical power. The utmost of rationality, for James, 
is the 11 feeling of suffi clancy of the present moment~ . ,~ A 
rationality which he stands for comes to be When things are 
acknowledged and taken account of as they come and present 
themselves. In other words, rationality is not a description 
of our actions or passions, but an appreciation; reason judges 
46 but does not analyze. 
c. Fechner's Influences 
In order not to anticipate too much of what shall follow 
in the next chapters, it will be stated briefly why Fechner 
4SH. M. Kallen, The Philosophy of William James, 3-7. 
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was appealing to James and what kind of influence he exercised 
upon him. 
Gustav Theodor Fechner was the son of a pastor; he liyed 
for seventy years at Leipzig. An inter•esting detail--pe·rl'l<:i:ps a . 
reason for sympathy ::· -_on l. the part of James--is that Fechner 
studied medicine, ~ut after he .had obtained his diploma from 
the University of Leipzig he decided not to become a medical 
Iii· doctor but to devote his life tOftphysica+ sciences. He became 
a professor and published many scientific books and treatises. 
Again, like James, he was leaning toward philosophy. He also 
for three years suffered much from an eye troUble and knew a 
nervous prostration while about thirty years old. The cri:sis 
found in James, is like a repetition of that of Fechner who 
had at that time a_ ~reat inner cr•isis and found release 1a,s ;h e 
"clung to the faith~" James says of Fechner: "His religious 
and cosmological faiths saved him. n47 V11hat he could have added 
is that he, himself ~ 9::f evy his own salvation wn the same source. 
"He drew from Fechner the conception of a great 'mother-sea' or 
'fountain-head' of cmsciousness in which all our finite con-
sciousnesses.~are ~confluen~ i"48 
Fechner arrived at his philosophy in a sudden revelation 
which came to him during illness and was developed throughout 
47A Pluralistic Universe, 147. 
48Eixler, op. cit., 48. 
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his life. Jean Wahl says: 
Sa philosophie naquit d'une r~v~lation soudaine 
qu'il eut pendant une l?ngue maladie qui trans-
forma sa vie; elle se developpa pendant t~ute 
cette derni~re p~riode de son existence ou, 
priv~ de livres, il laissait grandir en lui la 
vision d'un monde nouveau, d 1 un monde nempli 
d'ames.49 . 
A universe filled with souls,that is what James was long-
ing for. The system of thought of Fechner is not, however, 
purely pluralistic but dualisticat times: "As a dualist Fechner 
maintains that body and soul are alike manifestations of 
Reality.n 50 Fechner is even not afraid of monism with vvhich 
he deals also: 
From this dualistic Pluralism Fechner rises in 
grandiose style to monism, depending for the 
whole process on the Phenomenalist's method of 
compounding statesof consciousness to arrive at 
a finite conscious spirit, and the monist's 
method of compounding finite selves 81 spirits 
to arrive at an Absolute Individual. 
This suffices to explain the '· somewhat sarcastic words of 
James speaking of F1echner: nHis means were always scanty, so 
his only extravagances could be in the way of thought, but 
these were gorgeous ones.n52 
James recognized in Fechner a mind akin to his own. In 
Wt1t. 
him he .found a thinker discontenteQ.. _~ the systems of the 
49Les Philosophies Pluralistes, 38. ( Wahl is quoting Vundt 
50 freely). Hannie B. Baker, The Concept of a Limited God, 15. 
51Ibid., 16-17. 
52A Pluralistic Universe, 145. 
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absolutists and favorable to the doctrines insisting on the 
diversity of things, and b~ the personality of men and of God. 
In Fechner James found also a man following a method of mingled 
empiricism a.nd romanticism, and this appealed much to the re-
actionary American professor: 
Il (Fechner) est le paragon de 1 1 empiriste, ~crit 
James. Et son empirisme est essentiellement 
mefiance de l'abstraction ••• sa methode ne sera I , done pas fondee ~ur les ig2es simples at ne pro-
c~dera pas par deduction~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Thus we have first the admiration of James due to this re- J 
volt against Hegelianism. To take) the most ordinary type of 
reasoning, analogy will enable the thinker to build up his con-
ception of the universe. Since believing that the world is 
changing, always other, the new world cannot be deduced from 
the old. Analogy will be the means by which the moving uni• .. 
verse will be apprehended. 
Le philosophe d~ductif ne se servant que des 
raisonnements abstraits ne trouve plus davant 
lui qu'impossibilites et que contradictions, 
le philosophe qui part du concret reste toujours 
dans le reel et le possible.54 
1. The Concrete Versus the Abstract. 
As it is seen by the foregoing quotation interpreting 
James's thought, an important trend of thought appealed to 
James in Fechner, namely, the rejection of abstract reasoning: 
53Jean Wal.l, op. cit., 37. 
54Jean Wa~l, op. cit., 38. 
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"It is t he intense concre teness of F ec hner ••• which fills me j 
with an admiration. n55 James d.oes not seem afrai d of t he ab- I 
solu t ism of Pachner because 
to have much in co mmon with 
I 
};l'echner•s ::ioctr'ine "seems at flrst i 
ab solutism, but ••• when taken con- :I 
,, 
I 
cretely and temperamentally, really stands at the opposite 
I 
pole.u56 ~ · 
Resting on the authority of Henouvier for Pluralis:n, in-
1
1 
troduc ing Bergson ' s philosophy to j ustify a l"e~ol t ~gains t in-1 
tellectuali s m, J ames bring s in :B'echner to confJ.rm hJ. s revolt · 
aga inst the abstract .. The very beginning of the chapter "Con-
cernlne :B,echn er" is filled with attacks . It is c l e a rly seen 
i 
tha t, as in the case of Bergson, James i s less a nxious to pra : v - ~ 
sent P achner • s way of thinking t han to a rrive through it, and i 
thereby to prove and jus~ify his own t h eories . Some quota- J 
tions will h elp to streng then such a statement ancl shovv at tha i! 
same time th a t Ja na s was himself and not the copy of anybody 
else. 
From Green to Hal dane ""Ghe absolute pr•oposed to 
us to straighten out the confusions of the 
thicket of experience :tn which our l ife is 
passed remains a pure abstraction vlhich hardly 
anyone tries to make a vvhi·t concreter.57 
The abandonment of all pal"ticulars, in an attempt to 
I 
I 
II 
'I 
!I 
:I 
!I 
il 
j' 
I 
g ive a concrete sys tem through dialectics, c annot be swallowed! 
55william James, A Pluralistic Universe, 135. 
~~Ibid ., 135. 
Ib i d.., 136. 
!I 
il 
II 
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by James. "Mr. Haldane's Hegelianism," he says, "carries us 
hardly an inch into the concrete detail of the world we ac-
tually inhabit. "58 Passing from Haldane to McTaggart James j 
says that he 11 treats us to almost as thin a fare;' ~9 and quoting I 
1vlc Taggart's O\'m words (by which he says that vihat is the most 
practical in Hegel's system is "the abstract certainty" given 
by logic) James becomas a little sarcastic in the p~ge s .wh).ch 
lfolJ:o:w. All the Hegelian system and the interpretations of 
Hegelianism are, by James, criticized. He speaks of 
the thin, abstract, indigent, and threadbar e ap-
pearance, the starving, school-room aspect, whtch 
the speculations of most of our absolutist phi-
losophers presant.60 
Vlliy does James introduce Fechner? Because the German 
thinker stands against abstractness and his 11 thickness is. a 
refreshing contrast" because "he cared so much less than most 
philosophers care for abstractions of the 'thin' order; 1161 
because "For him the abstract lived in the concrete; 1162 because 
Throughout his \~itings Fechner makes difference 
arll analogy walk abreast, and by his extraordinary 
power of noticing both, he converts What would 
ordinarily pass for abjections to his conclusions 
into factors of their · support.63 
58william James A Pluralistic Universe, 139. 59 , Ibid., 140. 
60ibid., 144. 
~§Ibid., 149. 
Ibid., 149. 
63Ibid., 152. 
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2. The Pluralistic Tendencies. 
The second reason why James is willingly under the in-
fluence of Fechner is not only of prime importance but also 
more akin to the general subject of this thesis. If Fechner~ 
.thoughts -.arow:adrnany sympathies, it is as a pluralist, however, 
that he influenced J ..auJ.e Sl; mos,t • '·: _, , 
I L'on cornpr~nd que James ait aime cette philos-
ophie fondee sur un empirisme si large at si 
romantique, une philosophie si vivante, en-
combrea d'individualit~s.64 ----
In Fechner's system individuality is preserved and his 
God allows individual consciousnesses to live; they are con-
ceived as a plurality living beneath or beside God. They are 
somewhat in God though they remain individualities. In the 
words of James expounding Fechner's thought expressions such 
65 
as "independence of other external beings," "Complexity in 
unity,n66 11 Individuality of type, and difference from other 
beings of its type. n67 They all show clearly that the monism 
of Fechner could not shut the way to Pluralism in which James 
is now entering. 
Through Fechner's thoughts James was introduced to the 
. 
study of "forms 11 • Inclusiue forrns of consciousness are pa:r-tly 
64Jean Wahl, op. cit., 40. (Underlining mine) 
65William James, A Pluralistic Universe, 156. 
6~Ibid. , 157. 
6 Ibid., 158. 
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:I 
constituted by mora limited forms. 'rhis c·onception of a II 
Ji 
I plurality and diversity of forms in which a sum is neither re- j! 
cp. ired nor asked, leaves pl9nty of room to maintain a plu.ral il 
,, 
element which d.oes not disappear since no total is needed. 
As our mind is not the bare sum of our s igb.ts 
plus our sounds plus our pains ••• so the earth-
soul traces relations between the .gontents of 
my mind and the content of yours .. 6 
Fechner acknowledges individual minds or individual per-
sons; he writes about priv ate experiences. They al"'e parts of 
il 
I 
I 
; 
I 
!I 
Il 
II 
:I 
the great sys tern; nevertheless they maintain a full dis tincticn 
! 
I 
from one another. Distinct, and therefore plural, they realiz ~ 
themselves not in isolation but 11 a lon e; with one anot;her as to 11 
·I 
partial sys terns . " 69 li 
II James was much at;tra.cted to such a view. He found. 11 un d 
I 
savant qui ailiaet l'existence d'un Dieu personel et d 'ind.ividus I 
dans le mond.e. 1170 Here were not only a personal God and. indi-
P 
viduals but also a departure from a static ·world: "Thus iS th~ 
I 
universe ; alive, according to this philosopher 111 71 Thus , in 
I 
I 
spite of Fechner • s belief in one all-inclusive xnind, J a mes !I 
says that Idealism is constantly emphasizing the all , the one, I, 
the sum, the unity, whereas the "eaches", the individuals, \! 
the details i n a word, are unfortunately missing. 
~~Vlilliarn James, A P~urt~.listic Universe, 168-169. 
70rbid., 172. 
71Jean '!'.ahl, op. cit., 40. 
\ 1"illiam James, A Pluralistic Univer~, 173. 
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Fechner, on. the contrary, tries to trace the 
superiorities due to the more collective form 
in as much detail as he can. He marks the 
various intermedi~ry stages and halting places 
of collectivity.7 
James would prefer materialistic science to absolute 
idealism. He finds it "infinitely richer in terms, with its 
molecules, and ether, and electrons, and what not .~"73 .Monistic 
idealism has no concern for tll .::. -~·. ~ ,.,, . .,; i :.1i ·.::J~:· ,J .i C :· ./ . It is 
only concerned with extremes as if the detail, the intermediate, 
the particular, had not a place in the universe. Nothing but 
supreme, says the ordinary monistic idealism and James asks: 
"Doesn't this show a singularly indigent imagination? Isn't 
this brave universe made of a richer pattern, with room in it 
for a long hierarchy of beings?'' 74 To such a question he him-
self gives an answer by showing once more the mistake of in-
'II" tellectualismt\ttthinking of reality only under intellectual 
forms," and the mistake of absolute idealism knowing not "what 
to do with bodies ."75 And he adds: "The resultant thinness 
is startling waen compared with the thickness and articulation 
of such a universe aa J:t,echner paints. n76 
72william James, A 
~~Ibid., 175. 
Ibid., 175. 
7 5r.o c • cit. , 17 5 . 
7 6Loc. · cit~ , 175 . . 
Pluralistic Universe, 174. 
·' . 
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3. The Limited God. 
Another important mark of F'echner' s influence upon James 
appears in the doctrine of the finite God. 
As before stated the God of Fechner belongs to the abso-
lute order of divine spirit. Our spirits are classified among 
the hi~er orders of spirits and may reach the Absolute. The 
finite spirits, for F'echner, belong to human beings and "all 
the bodies of the universe form one body which is the body of 
I ~ 
God.n 77 Not onlyfhis God is "All-being" ~11 All-action", but 
his freedom is complete. The whole universe made up of finite 
parts ~ :~ related to God's universal mind and infinite body. 78 
According to the different interpreters of Fechner there 
is in his philosophy, at first, a place for finiteness in the 
u~iverse but 'this is not attributed to God. Jean, Wahl says 
that very definitely also: 
L'esprit fini reste immanent en Dieu et pourtant 
il est une ind.ivid.ualit~; et meme quand il 
apparait co~ne absorb~ par 1 1 individualite 
supreme il conserve sa personalite.79 
In 'this famous statement are found the reality of the in-
dividual, its individuality and personality, its immanence in 
God, the Supreme Individuality. To all of this James would 
add that: "Both Fechner and Professor Royce ••• believe ul ti-
~~R. B. Baker, The Concept of a Limited God,· 16. 
79 Ibid • , 17 • Jean Wahl, Les Philosophies Pluralistes, 39. 
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,. 
mately in one all-inclusive mind." 80 
~here is the place for a limited God in such a system? 
Would it not be a paradox? In order to answer the problem it 
is well to state that in the system of Fechner our acts can 
influence God. Or as Wahl puts it: 
Non seulement nous vivons d 1une vie individuelle, 
non seulement nous agissons, mais nos actions 
aggissent sur la Divinite elle-meme; chaque 
homme qui8~ait est une pens~e nouvelle dans 1 1 absolu. 
Quoting Fechner himself, Wahl says that not only the in-
dividuality of men is preserved in Fechner's system, but also 
that of the inferior Gods. Heave n:;, appeare as inhabited lby_, 
celestial beings, Gods or angels. 'I'he universe be comes a city 
of souls. 82 James attenuates also the absolutism of Fechner 
in his chapter on ucontinuity of Experiencen where he says: 
"Fechner himself is an absolute in his books, not actively but 
passively ••• Fechner's God is a lazy postulate of his, rather 
than a part of his system positively thought out.n83 
4. The Problem of Evil. 
Whether the diMine personality is one or whether it is 
many is a solved problem for James but even if God should be 
one, he would neither be absolute nor infinite a.:a :,3the:·-m.onistic 
theories affil·m. imd James in this sense is following Fechn,e:p 
~~William James, A Pluralistic Universe, 173. 
82Jean Wahl, Las Philosophie Pluralistes, 39. Ibid., 39-40. 83William James, A Pluralistic Universe, 293-294. 
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"close·ly . God is a finite consciousness; he is somehow like 
ourselves but much more comprehensive. Outside of this finite 
consciousness there are, and will always be, other consciou~- . 
1 
. e s . constituting for God an external environment. 84 I 
In his metaphysical theory, Fechner conceives God as com-
posed of finite beings, or inferior Gods. 11Le ciel apparait 
comme de nouveau habit~ par des ~tres cblestes, qu'on les 
nomme des Dieux ou. des anges.n85 Evil comes among the finite 
beings not from the will of God but with his permission. 
"Evil then becomes necessary" says Rannie B. Baker (inter-
preting Fechner) "not only as rna terial for divine will to v;ork 
upon but also as a principle of distinguislb.ing human selves 
from Divine Self. 11 86 By the acceptation of evil, Fechner, to 
whom the Omnipotent Absolute was however so precious, is com-
palled to arrive at a doctrine : which the idea of a finite 
God permeates. 
I'hat is precisely mat William James has found adequate 
for his own belief. He speaks of Fechner's concept of an all-
enveloping God, deducing that such a theory would make God 
responsible for everything, evil included. God would include 
also all the possible difficulties or paradoxes, and this is 
84Theodore .t•'Flournoy, The Philosophy of William James, 160. 
85Fechner, Tagesansicht, 31. {Quoted by Wahl, op • . cit., 39.} 
86op. cit., 20. 
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surely repulsive to the German philosopher. and James has 
seen in his system an answer and a key for his own concerning 
the problem of evil. To Flournoy he writes: 
I have just read the first half of Fechner's 
"Zend-Avesta," a wonderful book, bw: a wonder-
ful genius. He had his vision and knows how 
to discuss it, as no one's vision ever was 
discussed.87 . 
What James found in "Zend:~ Avesta" is an answer to his own 
riddle Which is a persisting one among all the present sincere 
thinkers, namely, the conciliation of evil with an Absolute 
God. The solution, it is true, is neither very precise nor 
unequivocal, but it is a new solution that James discovered in 
Fechner's system of thought. "Fechner tries sincerely to 
grapple with the problem of evil, but he always solves it in 
the leibnitzian fashion by making God non-absolute 1188 
In concluding this exposition of some of the most promi-
nent influences exercised upon William James, a puzzling ques-
tion may arise in the mind of the reader: how can :·a. ' , 
thinker - be simultaneously the afunirer of three different 
~~ ... 
systems as Athose of Renouvier, Bergson, and Fechner? For it is 
a fact that even if they all had something in common they are 
far from having an idantical view and interpretation of reality. 
It may be added also that James is far enough from being a 
87The Letters of William James, Vol. II, 300. 
88william James, A Pluralistic Universe, 294. 
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I follower of any of them. All these objections being exact and 
· sound can the riddle of the universe be solved? I venture to 
answer affirmatively. Captivated by the freedom and pluralism 
of the first~ interested by the concrete and intuitive theories 
of the secondi enlightened by the problem solving system found 
in the third, William James discovered in these three fo·rei gh 
thinkers the solid . r ock on Vlhich he will build his concept of 
a pluralistic universe. This he will do regardless of the 
other theories of each one, ·regardless of their different meta-
physics which had for him no immediate value or interest. 
IJ ·csuch is one side of his openmindedness and genius, namely, to 
look at others and take from them what he believes to be a part 
of the truth--regardless of the epoch, the school, the men, 
or the country to which they belong. 
II 
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CHAPT:ti:R 'l'HREJS 
PLURALISUi V~HSUS MONISM 
A. Inadequacy of Absolutism. 
Qur proceeding in the v~iting of the present thesis has 
been to give at first, as far as possible a concrete vie w of 
the whole problem. "The author of a book may take advantages 
of his readers by leading them to a destination known to him, 
but not to them. It is hoped that the method which is chosen 
may to some extent avoid t hat unfairness. 111 Following our 
professor's technique, it has seemed good to us to present 
at the beginning the problem as a whole and to proceed then 
to its exposition and explanation. 
" What James wanted ••• was to break up this cast-iron, 
monistic evolutionary vision and substitute for it an open 
universe. 112 Unsatisfied by what had already been found by 
monism, he was searching for a better interpretation of the 
universe. 11He was determined to keep watch for a white crow 
no matter how often he was assured that they were all black. 113 
Because of his remarkable openmindedness, even his opponents 
were of grea t interest to him. "He could not avoid taking 
~E. s. Brightman, Moral Laws, 97. 
c. H. Grattan, 'rhe Three Jameses, 130. 
3rbid., 136. 
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Royce's arguments for absolute idealism with tremendous 
seriousness when it eame to formulating his own thought.n4 
It is evident from the writings of James that he recog-
nized that the absolutism of Royc e was answering serious de-
sires and researches of sound philosophers. And, since many 
human minds were satisfied, since some positive fruits were 
indisputable, a kind of pragmatic justification was to be 
given to the absolute. In spite of that James could not ac-
cept it, and even directed all his arguments against it. The 
t heories of Royce became James's real enemy. George H. 
Palmer, the oldest professor of philosophy at Harvard writes: 
"In our lectures we were accustomed to attack each other by 
name, James forever exposing t h e follies of the idealists."5 
In h is essay entitled "On a Certain Blindness in Human 
Beings," James introduces a plurality not yet of the world bu t 
of looking at the world as a possible plural world. No one 
w~y can possib lW be sufficient. In this essay is found a doc-
trine of tolerance purporting to consider all types and con-
ditions of t hought. From tha t he arrived ~ the inference of 
me i mpossibility od} conceivk.g a world appearing as a single 
6 fact. 'I'hat a t ti t u de became later t,.-, James's positive theory 
of pluralism. 
4c. H. Gra t tan, rl'he Three J ame s es, 11'7. 
~Quote d by C. H. Gr a ttan, op. cit., 169-170. 
Ibid., ·149. · 
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. 1. F:acing the Truth Found in Monism. 
A monistic-pluralistic antithesis appears as a problem 
of first importance to William James. To him this is t he 
m~jbr .' question vmich can be found i n philosophy. Such a 
prob lem is of so much worth that in it he will find a source 
for "clea r ness 11 at t he expense of 11 unity " . 
But James will not take any position without having con-
s i dered the problem in detail and without having studied it 
thoroughly. He wi ll refute Positivism, because it 11 abruptly 
refused by an inhibitory action of the will to think any 
furth er, stamps the ground and says, 'Physics, I espouse t h eet 
fo1• better or worse, be thou my absolute 1 ' 117 Any idea of the 
absolute will henceforth arise in James as an occasion for 
furt her investigation. As early as 1879 his pen is directed 
toward a criticism of the monistic concept represented by this 
hate d word: ~baolute. "The Absolute is what has not yet been 
transcended, criticized or made relative. 118 In other words, 
Wiiliam James takes at first a position of doubt to ward 
general think ing tendencies accepting dogmatically reality as 
the Absolute. Of i t he is going to make a thoughtful and in-
68 
jl quisitive study: 
i 
II 
I 
! 
Every thought is absolute to us at the moment 
of conceiving i t or acting upon it. It only 
7 william James, Collected Essays and Reviews, 129. 
8 Ibid • , 129 • 
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becomes rel~t ive in the light or further 
reflection. 
It may be well to state at the outset tha t James has 
given , · the Absolute its due. Even in his latest works we 
find tributes paid to it, although his works are mostly di-
rected in a dif ferent line of thinking. He has rejected in-
tellectualism but he , . , g ives credit to it in terms 
almost surprising. He speaks· o f the "sublimest achievement 
. or intellectua list philosophy.nlO He also speaks or the 
"healthy faith" of the absolutists showing a rare unbiased 
. d 11 mln • 
It is, ho wever, in t h e field of religion that James is 
1 more easily a pacifist concerning the absolute: 
That sense or emotional reconciliation with 
God which characterizes the highest moments 
of the theistic consciousness may be described 
as 'oneness' with him, and so from the very 
bosom of theism a monistic doctrine seem to 
arise.l2 
The sinc.eri ty of William James is felt very easily 
throughout all his writings. He is unafraid of theories; he 
is r a ther anxious to tak e from every one the best he believes 
they contain. That is · why his superficial or prejudiced 
readers have a ccused him of inconsistencies and contradictions. 
One illustration, among many, can be round in Pragmatism, 
9 william James, Collected Essays and Reviews, 129. 
lOPragmatism, 145. 
11 .A Pluralistic Universe, ; 72. 
1 2The Will to Believe, 134-135. 
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where, after a battle directed against the absolute, he says: 
I called it majestic and said it yielded re-
ligious comfort to a class of minds, and then 
I accused it of remoteness and sterility. But 
so far as it affords such comfort, it surely 
is no t sterile; it has that amount of value; 
it performs a concrete function. As a good 
pragmatist, I myself ought to call the Absolute 
true 'in so far forth,' then; and I unhesi-
tatingly now do so.l3 
2. A Reformed Monism. 
Is it possible to be fair to James's thought, especially 
to his pluralistic view of the universe, and then to state 
\I 
I 
I 
'I 
!t 
!I 
li 
that he was .!!2.t an absolute pluralist? If, as we have already , 
seen in this chapter, James ie not searching~~ new system but r~r 
more light; if, there is a possible triumph of the good, this I 
will be a state where, somehow, unity shall reign. The wo1 .. ld I 
marches toward unity, affirms James. 14 V'iould he reject the 
idea that the world is unceasingly unifying itself through 
works, combinations, and relations of its many elements? We 
hardly think so. The pluralism of James leads not to oneness 
but to a unifying principle. .He rejects the one but he keeps 
!i 
:I 
ii 
! 
I 
I 
I 
i 
unity, m~ich unity is in accord with pluralism. The revolt of iJ 
!I James against monism is not primarily to create a pluralism 
but rather to arrive at a Reformed 1Yionism. The system of 
thought ·advocated by James "must equally abjure absolute 
1 ;3 W!~J_l_i~~ .J~es, Pragmatism, 73. 
I 
l4~ssays in Radical Empiri cism, 47. 
! 
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monism and. absolute pluralism. 1115 
Does this mean that James was not a pluralist? Certainly 
not; but if he affirms himself to be a radical empiricist 
throughout his philosophy, he also makes numerous statements 
strong enough to deserve the attention of any impartial 
thinker. James was taking Renouvier, Bergson, and Fechner as 
a help not merely in order to arrive at a plural concept but 
in order t o condemn or transform the theory already existing. 
He sought to revtse it. In other words James tried to do for 
monism what Luther tried to do for the Roman Catholic Church. 
He is the reformer of absolute metaphysics. Vfuat he tries to 
show is not that monism should be destroyed but rather that 
"the absolute has to have a . pluralistic vision. nl6 He tries 
not to annihilate the "block universe" but to show that the 
many should be "preserved in all their manyness as the one's 
VVhat James tries to get at is the fact that II eternal object •11 
J uThe absolute itself is thus represented by absolutis ts as 
1 having a pluralistic object. 1117 
·' 
These observations are confirmed by the amazing fact that 
A Pluralistic Universe is the least pluralistic of James's 
JJ latest works. It is in Pragmatism that the reader · s.ear_che's . L 
I 
James's "Diet of 'Norms." Later on, when the tempest is past, 
15williarn J arne s, Pragmatism, 156. 
16A Pluralistic Universe, 311. 
17Loc. cit., 311. 
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James will continue in his ne w way of thinking with an enthu-
siastic satisfaction. Because of his separation from Classi-
cism, the One Catholic Absolute, and what has been held hard 
and fast as the sole and ONE truth, the monists will no longer 
call him a philosopher just as t;he church no longer called 
Luther a Christian. 
Confidence can be given to a pluralist mo even when corn-
batting the absolute, can write that "philosophy has indeed 
18 
manifested. above all things its interest in unity." Such a 
thinker is at least free from prejudice who can show the truth 
of 11 the details of fact" without throwing overboard "their re-
duction to system. 11 The "variety" 'iof things and their "to.-
tality11 James would like to reconcile with empiricism. 
Unity doesn't blind them (the empiricists) 
to everything else, doesn 't quench their cu-
riosity for special facts, whereas there is 
a kind. of rationalist who is sur•e to interpret 
abstract unity mystically and to forget every-
thing else.l9 
Stated differently, James sees the oneness of the universe 
but he sees it differently .fro1n. the monist: "Granting the one-
ness to exist," he says, "what facts will be different in con-
sequence?n It is the str ucture and formation of the One wh ich 
interest James: 11 'I'he world is One--yes, but h~ one • 11 He 
thinks that the One of the monist is a mere formula, 11 a sort of 
18william James, Pragmatism, 129. 
19Ibid., 131. 
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number-worship 11 as three or seven are looked at as sacred 
numbars. VVhat James is aiming at is to pass "from the vague 
to the defini t e, from the abstract to the concrete. 20 
At this point the reader anxiously asks again: Is not 
James the champion of pluralism? fxiy ans wer is again affirma-
21 tive. But what appears positively in his philosophy, as I 
have tried to show, is that of a pluralism someWhat related 
to monism. A polygon is a polygon and a circle is a circle 
you say. That is true but Wi illiam James would rather say, 
(if I understand him aright) my concept of a pluralistic uni-
verse is far from being a circle, even at the antipodes. 
\iiould he accept it as a polygon within a circle? The circle 
representing the ideal whole and the abstract; the polygon 
representing the actual manyness, the parts, and the concrete? 
Such questions cannot be answered affirmatively without much 
circumspection. 11 'fuis world may, in the last resort, be a 
block-universe; but strung-along, not rounded in and closed.11 ::2 
If its manyness were so irremediable as to 
permit no union Whatever of its parts, not 
even ourminds could 'mean' the -whole of it 
at once ••• But in point of fact we mean to 
cover the whole ••• which ex~ressly intends that 
no part shall be left out. 3 
The absolutism of the monist displeases James because it 
is a theory based on faith and affirmed "dogmatically and ex-
73 
ij 
elusively;" because of a "dogmatic rigoristic temper;" because 
in the One there must be many things and a separation among 
these things; because the universe cannot be stiff and rigid 
but must include 11 some tremor• of independence, some free play 
of parts on one another some real novelty or chance. 1124 
Therefore James's pluralism is not a radical pluralism, 
for it cannot be denied that he sees some kind of 11 total one-
ness" to come at least "at the end of' thlngs :~n 25 But if an 
opponent to pluralism would try to show that from the outset 
to the end James was somehow a monist; if from these impartial 
emphas~$ of mine the lover of the absolute would turn the 
thesis against its writer; even if it could be stated that 
James from his own words stands for 11 the unity of the uni;.,; .·: 
verse; 1126 t'b.a victory for James is on the plural is tic side. 
The careful student will find James sarcastic about your dear-
est absolutist belief, stating that it 11means less than 
nothing. 11 1J.lhe monistic Cl"edo: "Deus est Ens, a se, extra 
et supra omne genus, necessarium, unum, infinite perfectum, 
simplex, irnmutabile, irnmensura., aeternum, intelligens, n 27 finds 
you, according to James's own words, "Stupidly staring at a 
pretentious sham1 1128 
Pragmatism, 160. 24 Vvilliam James, 
~~Ibid., 159. 
I' Ibid., 159. 
I 27Ibido 1 12lo 
28Loc. cit. 
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1~e real point of difference between James's unity and 
the monist's oneness has been pointed out in the foregoing 
quotations~ Buf'fice it to adq_r that .James's unity is not found 
in a "mad absolute" nor is his world a 11 block-universe 11.29 By 
introducing in his concept some play, some freedom, some parts, 
some separation, some independence, some things left to chance 
and to evil, William James arrived at his Pluralistic Reforma..; 
tion. 
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B. Getting Free from Monism. 
1. Hegel's Absolute Rejected. 
How will James enter into this battle with monism? If we 
go back far enough in the evolution and revolution of his ovm 
thinking, many traces are i'ound in the chapter entitled "On 
Some Hegel isms. 1130 There, considering the spatial order as a 
unit, he presents "this very paragon of unity" with parts of 
"infinite variety '~" 11 The one is the whole, the many are the 
parts. Each part is one again, but only one fraction.n3l 
What was seen as belonging to a .perfect continuous whole is 
already viewed differently: "For motion is motion, and light 
is light, and heat, heat forever, and their discontinuity is 
32 
as absolute as their existence." Henceforth a place is 
going to be given to the particular, and the word 11 each11 will 
be introduced and welcomed. This, naturally, is an understood 
criticism of Hegel which· is further plainly expressed: 
Since he (Hegel) will take nothing but the 
whole, he must throw away even the part he 
might retain, and call the nature of things 
an absolute muddle and incoherence •.• 
Why seek for a glue to hold things to-
gether when their very falliqg·apart is the 
only glue you need?33 
James presents the Hegelian system Which he calls the 
11 principle of totality." There is no real criticism there on 
~~Wil ~iam J ~me s , ~e __ Wi 1 ~--~~;selieve, 265T298. 
Ibid., 26.:> 32 Ibid., 267 -
33rbid., 273. 
-------- - -- --- - --- ----- -
I' 
the part of Jrunes, it is rather a tentative explanation of 
facts which later on he will put in doubt. Nov1 he just as-
serts what the facts are: 11 This principle {of totality) says 
that you cannot adequately know even a part until you know of 
what vJhole it forms a part." 34 He will still maintain the 
reality as being one but vnth some important reservations: 
"The world appears as a monism and a pluralism. 1135 But what 
will keep James away from Hegel is this most important dis-
tinction made by James, namely, "that the world cannot be set 
down in any single proposition.tt 36 Vvhat Hegel most abominates 
belongs to the distinctions made between the one and the many; 
if different propositions about the world are possibl~ these 
propositions expressing it are one. With this James disagrees 
asserting that: 
Any one who insists that their diversity is in 
any way itself their unity, can only do so be-
cause he loves obscur~1Y and mystification for 
their own pure sakes. 
To be sure James is not fighting against idealism it may 
be well to de.duce this certainty from his own words: "I have 
not myself the least objection to ideal1sm ••• But I object to 
proving by these patent ready-made ~ priori methods that which 
can only be the fruit of a wide and patient induction." 3~ 
341~'illiam James The Will to Believe, 27t~. 35.. .. ' '( 
36 Ibia.., 280. 37Ibi d., 280. 
38Ibid., 280. Ibid., 290. 
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I The 11 all-or-nothing" advocated by Hegel e.nd of Which he is 
never tired of, James calls "silly hegelian all-or-nothing in-
39 I satiateness. 11 Consciousness may be united on some common 
II grounds, according to J ame s, but each one is having a "private 
40 
store whi ch the others do not share." 
In eleven 11 propositions 11 William James gives the reasons 
why he is "not an. hegelian. 11 Instead of giving any of these 
propositions it seems suf1' icient to quote a single sentence 
which may stand as a summary of them: 
In the universe of Hegel--the absolute block vmose 
parts have no loose play, ••• --there can be neither 
good nor bad, but one dead level or mere fate.41 
1viost surely James is searching. As a fair thinker he 
acknowledges that the problem is big and worthy of discussion 
and caref'ul investigation: 11 The absolute is surely one of the 
I great hypotheses of philosophy; it must be thoroughly dis-
~~ cussed. " 42 
I 2. From Universals to Particulars. 
Time arrived for James to take a definite and active po-
sition. One can be a monist or a pluralist but in the matter 
of thinking as in almost every phase of a coherent life it is 
not possible to be perL1anently devlded or undecide d . .On .-
I 
II 39vHlliam James, 'rhe lNill to BeliBve, 292. 
!~Ibid., 291. 
42Ibid., 29 2. Collected Essays and Heviews, 469. 
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I April 30, 1903, James expressed in a letter to Theodore Flour-
noy the ne w aim of his philosophy by these words: 11 V\Ihat I want l 
to get at, and let no interruptions interfere, is (at last) my : 
system of tychistic and pluralistic philosophy of pure ex-
perience ." 43 Henceforth his vision of the world will be indi- 1 ~ I 
vidualistic and empirical. 1 
How he was partly led to it through foreign influences I 
has been already presented in the preceding chapter, but it j 
may be well to say also that James was an empir:tcist by nature. ll 
I 
He is going to use philosophy as an impression of temperaraent; !j 
as a sort of presentation and explanation of things or of feel-! 
I 
ings. James likes to see things by the particular and the con-! 
crete, he has a strong tendency not t o walk by faith but by 
fact. Putting the rationalist on one side and the empiricist 
on the other he disregards the first because of its dogmatism 
and adopts the second because he finds it much more open to 
44 
discussion. 
i 
I 
I 
'I 
!I 
il 
\I d 
H q 
It was first through the influence of Professor Agassiz, wljlo 
II senct.~ .. :·:· him back to nature and to facts for his scientific re- i 
searches, that he lea rned to dislike abstraction. Li kewt se, 
Chauncey ·vvright, 11 the gre a t Harvard empiricist of' my youth," 
taught him that ·"Behind the bare phenomenal facts ••• there is 
43
·williarn J ames, Letters, Vol. II, 187. 
44pragrnatism, 10-11. 
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nothi~. 1145 
The concrete is now so important for James that he almost 
worship s fa cts: 
There is included in human nature an ingrained 
naturalism and materialism of mind which can 
only admit facts that are actually tangible. 4 6 
The "intire flux," which the pluralist cuts ad libitum, 
wh ich he regards as a 11 sum or collection" or as an 11 eno1~mous 
number 11 not related or remotely related .to one another, is the 
empiricist attitude toward the universe. The vJhole is only 
47 
a "resul tant 11 of these distinct parts. If that is the po-
sition of William James--and most surely it is as we shall see 
!I more f'ully--he is in contradiction with rational monism and, 
II therefoi•e, must justify his contrary minded attitude. F'or 
II 
I 
I 
monism, the whole is fundamental, the parts derive from the 
whole and one another, or all in all, belong to the One. The 
separations accepted by the pluralist are to the monist me1~e 
illusions, for to him the universe is not the sum of parts but . 
the genuine unit constituting 11 uri seul fait et une grande 
I , 
ver i te. u48 
What is James going to answer to such questions as: Is 
the universe one or many? Does reality exist in unity or 
diversity? 11Distributively 11 or 11 collectively? 11 Will he dare 
to deny that the _11 all 11 is the real? Yes• Now James is ready 
4465W;f;lli.am James__, Pragmatism, 263. 
7 1he h ill to Jjeiieve, 52. ~8 Some Problems of Philosopht~ 113-114. 
Ltc./<H.~., ( vvords of' a• AI ember J 
====-=-=-=-=-·fl-• -=--=---==-=--: : =--=.--=--::=.----== -o-
1 
II 
·I 
80 
to stand for pluralism, and pluralism stands for the part, 
the 11 each, 11 the 11 every. 11 Reality is not confined to the 
whole, but is extended to the distributive formsof being. 
Pluralism is therefore affirmative as to the diversity 
found. in the world an:i negative as tothe argument that the 
world does not involve disconnection: 
The irreductible outness of any thing, how-
ever infinitesimal, from any thing else, in 
any respect, would be enough, if it were 
solidly established, to ruin the monistic 
doctrine.49 . 
If one asks ;., why was William James so much a tti•ac ted by 
pluralism·; the answers are numerous but the surest one is 
that in pluralism, tne particular finds a place. James ag1•ees 
with the nominalist:i.c/ioctrine which is always appealing to par-
ticular s: 
One must know concrete instances first: for ••• 
one can see no farther into a generalization 
than just so far as one's previous acquain-
tance "Eb th particulars enables one to take 
it in. · · 
So it is f or ideas and thoughts . The idea m'\,ist find its 
place just after the present experience at a partlcular point 
in order to bind with it. Pluralism "converts the absolutely 
empty notion of a static re lation of 'correspondence' ••• be -
tween our minds and reality, into that rich and active 
49 Willi am J ames, ~ome Problems of Philoso~ht' 115. 
50The Varieties· :_-, of Religious ~xperience, 1' • 
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co~ner ce ••• between particular thoughts or ours, a nd t he great 
universe of o t her experiences in vmich they play t he.ir pa rts 
and have their uses. n5l 
'l1he Absolute !Vlind is looked at by t h e monist, as com-
pletely indifferent to what is happening through the parti-
cular t h ings in the world. The Absolute is the "rational pre-
supposition or all particulars or fact, whatever they may ·'· · 
52 
be. 11 Another fact deplored by J-ames lies in the helpless-
ness or the Absolute in order to come dovvn to the ·world , our 
world made up, however, of particulars. Without any aid or 
explanation whatever the Absolute assures, or rather assumes, 
that 11 tout est bien dans 1e meilleur des mondes." On it you 
can rest and feel secure. 
The revolt o f J ames becomes acute a .t this point, for em-
il piricism1 s needs and rights are completely disregar ded. The 
I .Absolute sh ows himself rich and all powerful, but V'.ib.ere can be 
found such attributes for the world in which there is need for / 
. I 
small and humble contributions. The Absolute's "menial ser- i 
vices are needed in the dust of' our human trl als, even more 
than his dign i ty is needed in the empyrean. 1153 
Through us the pluralistic philosophy represents the 
,I world, the actual world with its concrete peculiarities as 
1
!, 
I
I ~~William James, Pragma tism, 69. 
Ibid., 71. 
. i 53 
· II Ibid., 72. 
:1 . I=~~ t===~~c~~~==" I. I I 
I' 
I 
82 
.I This is one of the e li-I relevant : to the content of truth. 
I 
maxes reached by James. Particulars have a place, a prominent 
p l ac e, percepts are contrasted with concepts, and finally the 
universe itself is a universe of particulars. 
If you can gather philosophic conclusions of 
any kind, monistic or pluralistic, from the 
particulars of life, I will say ••• 1Ring out, 
ring out my mournful rhymes, but ring the 
fuller minstrel in.t54 
c. Pluralism, A Better Interpretation. 
1. It Eliminates Determinism. 
"The facts of the vvorld 11 have always been of great in-
terest to William James ... tlhat is why 11 The Dilemma of Deter-
minism11 presents so vividly the diff iculties existing between 
action and. unity. By V'.ih ~~t · ·:. p rocess is James going to under-
take a thorough criticism of the absolute? He will use a 
method; a dissociating method which shall be together practi-
cal, psychological, positive, and particular. It will be also 
a method. of reserve and of exper•ience, and not an inquiry into 
the or igin or cause. But at any rate the inquiry made will 
reveal facts, and these f&cts will reveal the defects of 
monism's pretentious 11 claim11 that the universe is an absolute 
unity and. a "logical necessity." 
The great claim of the philosophy of the abso-
lute is that the absolute is no hypothesis, 
54 william James, A Pluralistic Universe, 331. 
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but a presupposition implicated in all think-
ing, and needing only a little effort of' analysis 
to be seen as a logical necessity.55 
James is not ready to accept the pretention that the 
absolute is able to conf'er 11 religious stability and peace." He 
has great doubts about what he regards only as claims or hy-
j potheses: "The universe is tigh~, monism claims, not loose; 
I' 
I 
I 
and you must take the irreducible whole of' it as it is offered, 
or have no part or lot in it at all."56 
James does not want to accept an unceasing look backwards 
for principles; what he wants is a shifting attitude passing 
from backwards to forwards, from principles to facts •57 He can-
not agree that the world can exist in no other way than as 
11 the object of one infinitely knowing mind. 11 There are many 
other criticisms raised by James: again and again he is puz-
zled by the monistic interpretation of reality. Most of his 
prominent objections make James raise a question to him of 
fundamental importance. "If nothing exists but as the Abso-
lute iviind knows it, how can anything exist othervvise than as 
that lvl ind knows it? " 58 The fact of' OUl' finite consciousness 
has no part and no place in such a theory. The limited mind 
knows things apart from other things; the Absolute mind~ on 
the contrary, knows the each and all through a single expres-
55william James, A Pluralistic Universe, 52. 
56some Problems of Philosophy, 136. 
57pragma tism, 122. 
58some Problems of Philos.ophy, 138. 
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s i6n: .of knowledge. 
Pluralism affirms the existence of evil, thus many diffi-
culties at once disappear or rather are confined exclusively 
to how t h ey can be fought and overcome. But, if for pluralism 
such a problem is merely a practical one, for .mOnism it is a 
genuine theoretical riddle. And James asks: "How--if Per-
fection be the source, should there be Imperfection?n59 If 
the universe were perfect, would it not be known as such and 
not otherwise? 
wnat is "perceptually experienced11 as reality is treated 
1 as an illusion or a mirage by the absolutist. Vfuile change, 
variations, novelties, seem to be characteristics of the worl~ i 
11 the world of the Absolute is represented as unchanging, 
eterna l, or I out of time, I and is foreign to · our powers either 
of apprehension or of appreciation." 60 The character of 
reality, as experienced, is altogether disregarded and reject-
ed by monism. 
Finally, determinism and its fatalistic necessity raised 
many doubts in William James1s thinking. According to his own 
view determinism is the most sta tic theol~y: 
It professes that those parts of t he universe 
already laid do>m absolutely appoant and de-
cree what the other parts shall be. The ••• 
part we call the present is compatible with 
59wi lliarn James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 139. 
60Ibid., 139 • 
I 
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only one totality. Any other future complement 
than the one fixed from eternity is impossible.61 
Monism classifiea possibility in the same realm with 
I necessity or rather r~jects it altogether as a mere illusion. 
I 
I 
I 
,J 
"Vvhat exists, what is, whatever it may be is necessary and that 
is sufficient. Novelty and originality are entirely banished. 
The professor of Cambridge could not agree with such determi-
nism. That which is native to our nature and common-sense he 
cultivates; and that is just what monism rules out. Vv'hat 
hQman nature craves ~or so often is for novelty but this is 
a Borbidden possibility wlth absolutism: nothing can ever be 
genuinely new; the future and the past must somehow be one, 
for they are linl{ed together by unbreakable L· b'0Uds. Any 
novelty can only be an addition to \~at has already and will 
always be. Transcendentql idealism speaks of the eternal 
cause and of the impossibility of a disunion of the many; it 
is an absolute union of Which par t s could not be except by and 
'I for the .One. 
I 
I 
lj 
I 
I 
I 
Against this notion of ~he unity of origin of 
all things there has always stood the plu-
ralistic notion of an eternal self-existing 
manv in the shape of atoms or even of spiri-
tuai units of some sort.62 
2. It Eradicates the Static Concept. 
'l'he quiet determinism of the Absolute is looked at by 
James as a disastrous interpretation of reality. 
662l williarn James~ The ·will to Believe, 150. Pragmatism, 139. 
He wants war 
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and wants to be free to fight. Our purposes are not peaceful 
1 but "at war with each other;" each one tries to crush the 
other out. James does not want a triumph without a battle in-
volving peril. '.ro him as to Corneille, 11 A vainc:r•e sans p~ril, 
on triomphe sans gloire." James sees an unfinished universe, 
an unfinished unification of its parts; a world in the process 
o:f organization: nvvhoever claims absolute teleological unity, 
1 saying that there is one purpose that every detail of the uni-
\1 verse sub s erves, dogmatizes. " 63 In other words, James refuses 
I 
i 
I 
I 
' 
to agree with the monists that 11 the bitter makes the cocktail 
better • 11 He refuses. to accept a theory showing evi 1 . good, be-
I 
cause it is considered by che monist instrumental to the great 1' 
er perfection of the universe. He refuse~ to place horror and 
tranquility on the same level and for the -one same purpose of 
the Absolute. The world of James is a world not yet certain to 
be saved; a world where per•fection is not yet and is even con-
di tional; a world in v.hich chances of taking part in its making 
are offered. Such a world is far from being a secure, safe, 
and warranted place, it is rather filled with adventure, dan-
ger, war, and difficulties of all kind. There is a victory, 
James would say, but victOI'Y vms never attained without a 
battle of some sort; there is a possibility to get through and 
63
william James, Pragmatism, 142. 
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reach the goal, but that must be made possible through a gen-
uine creative work. There are grea t risks to face, but what a 
64 
possibility to wint 
It is such a world that Jame s 's phi losophy presents as 
oppose d to monism. He presents a universe offering perplexi-
ties but inviting participation in order to make it co-
herent. He would call a coward hiill who would reject such a 
world because of' insufficient safety. To the "healthy-minded" 
Professor of Cambridge such a world appeals and challilenges : 
Would you say that, rather than be part and 
parcel of so fundamentally pluralistic and 
irrational a universe, you preferred to re-
lapse into the slumber of nonentity from 
which you had been momentarily aroused by 
the tempter's voice?6~ . 
What _a ,. monisti c metaphysics cherish~James hates. The 
prospect of a worla of chance without safety ~s of great ap-
peal to him whereas he rejects a world in which the only 
escape is to give up--even before the battle. He rejects the 
concept of a universe whe re all possibilities and personali-
ties are submerged or absoi•bed 11 into the absolute life as a 
drop of wate r melts into the river o:e the sea. 1166 Absolutism 
1 
should be kept as a last r•esource, according to James, as a 
I I 
"saving scheme" when all the possible chances have been put to 
work , or 11.V'ihen men are reduced to their last sick eX:tremity.n67 
64vvilliam James, Pragmatism, 140-142; 288-290. 
%~Ibid., 291. Ibid., 292. 
67Ibid., 29 3 . 
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Vlihat James sees in the world is struggle through which a 
pass must be made. The world is also constantly changing, 
moving, and living. That is a basic principle of J"ames's con-
caption of the Universe in which a permanent drama is going 
on; evil is going to be conquer•ed and good will triumph. 
Therefore, the great and primary task of men is to collaborate 
with God in such a mighty task. This warfare leads to an 
i 
ideal vvhich is sustained by faith and the freedom of' the will~-· 1 
I 
If the two types of thinking, classified by James as 
rational1. s ts and empiricists, or "tender-minded" and 11 tough-
minded," 68 come ;~ to the memory of the reader, the easier it 
will be to see distinctly the causes of J ames ts re-
jection of monism. While the mon:lst is starting from the whole 
I 
or universals, the pluralist begins with the parts, the parti-
cular, making the whole a mere collection; while the monist is 
plainly satisfied to share the freedom and the wi l l of the Ab-
solute, James wants a "freedom of the will " of his own: a 
genuine, particular will; while the rationalist is "a man of 
feeling" the empiricist "prides himself of being hard-headed." 
1,1 James chooses the 11 tough" side; he stands for empir icism and 
I 
openmindedness, qualities which he is not able to find in the 
"tender" vvay of thinking. · "The rationalist ••• will be of dog-
1 matic temper in his affirmations, while the empiricist may be 
I 
I §$W~~liam _ J ame s , P~agmatism, 10-12. 
I IL . 
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I more sceptical and open to discussion." 69 James does not want i· 
I a peac~ which does not cost some effort; the everlasting arms 
of the Absolute have no attraction for a tough-headed being 
meeting and enduring evil. That is why he states time and 
1 again that "the absolutistic scheme appeals to the tender-
minded while the pluralistic scheme appeals to the tough. 1170 
Thus, assuredly, one of the profound reasons which im-
pelled William James towards pluralism rests on the great at-
tr a ction exercised upon his thinking by the ideas of the hard 
soul. Even if he does not accept all the tendencies of the 
tough-minded wh:b• ... .a~e·- empirical, irreligious, material is tic, 
pessimistic, fatalistic, pluralistic, and skeptical, he stands 
il 
II 
II 
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I 
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11 
ill 
against monism for the very fact that the monist rejects these 1: 
'I II 
characteristics. What he vvants is to face facts as he use to i1 
II 
do in his youth. 71 As over against monism his empirical met.hod ;: 
il 
will not go beyond nor rise above facts. "~Facts' are the : 
i 
~8William J§lllles, Pragmatism, 11. I 
libid., 293. II 
1
7 "I play with boys who curse and swear" Henry James, A Small I 
I
I Boy and Others, 271. 
72Willia.In James, The Will to Believe, 271. 
1 
li 
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I 
starve to death under the monistic reg ime1 He can bu t pro t est 
and g e t rid of t hat vmich h e d epicts as 11 worlring our ideas in 
a vacuum made of conceptual abstractions ."73 The pluralis t ic 
universe of William James accepts the theory that the world is 
unfinished; that it is filled with novelty and freedom 11 with 
doors and windows open to possibilities uncontrollable in ad-
vance, ••• working out an uncertain destiny • 11 7 4 
It may be asked: does this concept vvhich appears as 11 an 
intolerable i~ea to the rationalistic mind, 11 contain some ad-
vantages over monism? To such a question William James would. 
at once present as an ans wer that pluralism "agrees more with 
the moral and dramatic expressivene ss ,of life." But what may 
be still more striking in the comparison, what to James appears 
, as incontestable in favor of pluralism, is its scientific and 
verifiable ground: " ·ro make the c onjunctions more vi tal and 
pr i mordial than the separations, monism has to abandon veri-
fiable experience." 75 Whatever is, affirms monism, can never 
be absent from anything else which is, whatever it may be. 
What is the reply of the pluralist? Vvhat objections woul d 
J a mes present to such a statement? He would say that since 
past, present, and future are not present to one anothe1•, since 
the future is adding to the past \rlthout being a part of it, 
73william James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 140. 
74rbid., 141-142. 
75rbid., 143. 
91 
- - - ·- -c:-_..:=:=-."--=-====::c... ----~------ - - ---~ -=--=--=====--=--=-==--=-======-=-=--=-lf=--=-=-c:=--=--=-=-=--==-
novelty exists as seE_arated from history: "The plu.rallstic 
principle ••• is quite compatible with some things being absent 
from operations in which other things find themselves singly 
76 
or collectively engaged. 11 Thus, from the calm world of the 
monist William James brings us into the ever moving universe 
of the pluralist with its s tor•ms and clashing waves, a uni-
verse 11 growing in all sorts of places, n whereas the ubell~l­
band11 of the rationalist1 s universe 11 must be tight • 11 77 
·what are the 11 r:tval metaphysical hypotheses 11 between 
monism and pluralism? On the monist side there is a universe 
made up of 11 many edi tions 11 oi' whi ch one is the well finished, 
the real, the perfect one, 11 the infinite folio; 11 it is the 
final and eternally complete n~dition de luxe." On the plura-
list side a single edition of the universe appears; this edi-
tion is imperfect, unfinished, growing unceasingly. The 
universe is not tight but loose, filled with 11 opportunism. 11 rs 
And if one asks from where can the truth come in this rather 
11 anarchistic 11 type of universe, James answers: 
Truth grows up inside of a ll the finite ex-
periences. They lean on each other, but the 
whole of them, if such a whole there be, leans 
on nothing. All 1homes1 are in finite ex-
perience; finite experience as such is home-
less. Nothing outside of the flux secures the 
issue or it. It can hope salvation only from 
its own intrinsic promises and potencies.79 
76 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 144. 
??pragmatism, 259. 
~~Ibid., 259. 
Ibid., 260. 
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William James wants man to bring a contribution to the 
world in order not so much to find its truth _as ·. to create its 
truth. Away with ties and oneness, with a universe unexposed 
to difficulties and accidents, with the eternal and unshakable; 
a way with the 11 absolutely Real 11 and its solid and sure "resting 
deep 11 contrasted with the "stm•my surface 11 on which we live; 
away with this 11 Reality with the bi g R, reality that makes the 
timeless claim, reality to which defeat can't happen."80 In 
a word, away with the postulates of the tender-minded monist. 
Open wide the door to the tough-minded thinkers for the plu-
ra li sts are "the men whose alpha and omega are facts. u81 
~~ -: illi~ Jam~ s, Pragmatism, 260. 
up. Cl t., 263. 
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CHAPTER F0UH 
'£ HE 'I' .K I UrilPH OB' PLUH..c-J... I Sl'll 
This last chapter aims at a presentation of a comprehen-
sive sur ve y - of the pluralistic concept of' William James as 
brought into consideration heretof'ore. However, new elements 
will be added a.Yld mingled with the ... Yh10le in order t o clarif'y, 
jus t if'y, and answer some pl"Oblems r aised and willing ly lef't 
1. The "Via iledia" 
The p roblem between opt i mi sm and pessimism, good and 
ev i l, h as been much discussed in every field of thinking and 
by every type of thinker. William James has viewed and solved 
the riddle in a new way in order to arrive at a solution i n 
harmony with his pluralistic theory of the un:i.verse. 
It is at once asked: Is William James an optimist? Will 
he agree with Browning and say: "God's in his heaven--all's 
right with the world?" Or is he going to follow Leibniz, who 
in his f'amous theory of evil {Theodicy) proved by rational 
arguments that the world in which we happen to live is the 
bes t possible world? Woula. James agree with the general 
monistic doctrine that evil is a mere necessary incident con-
94 
II 
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tributing to the highe s t perfection? r he contents of the pre-
vious chapters have already proved the negative answer that 
James would give to an altogether optimistic concept . 
If the questions r aised about optimism are applied to 
pessimism what do we find? Would James b e desperate as to the 
evil found in the world? I s his attitude such as Voltaire's? 
"Either God can prevent evil and he will not ; or he wishes to 
prevent it and he cannot _;" Or, in other words , 11 \Tvhen you have 
shown, • . • why so many men cut their throats in the best of all 
l possible worlds~ I shall be exceedingly obliged to you." 
1Nould hilliam James in his strong affirmations of the reality 
cit 
of evil, go as far as ~openhauer• Who attempted to give a logi-
cal proof that this world is the worst possibl~, world? 
2 Such are not the ways of James. He sees a universe in 
whi ch is g oing on the "everlasting battle of the powers of 
light with those of darkness ; 11 a world 11 reduced to its bare 
chance , yet ever and anon snatching v i c t o ry from the jaws of 
death . " In the unacceptable doctrine of monism "there was no 
potentlality of death in sight anywhere , and no point of' the 
compass vislble from Which danger might possibly· appear . II 
There is found only "the charm and ease of everything, II a 
world 11 wi tb.out a sin, without a victim , without a blot , with-
'j l Q.uoted by W. Dur ant, The St ory of Philosophy, 246 . 
2The following lines are a per s onal i nterpretation of James's 
early trend of thought . Of . Talks ~o Teachers, 268-273. 
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1 out a tear." That ideal place is to James unsatisfying. He 
went in it, but when "emerging into the dark and wi cked world 
again 11 he excla imed: 11 0uf~ what a relieft ••• Let me take my 
chances again in the big outside wordly wilderness with all its 
sins and suffering s." In the Absolute the ideal is too corn-
pletely victorious already, James wants battles, or at least 
some remaining sign from other previous battles.. The plui•al 
universe is made up of heroes~ the ide a l is neither for the One 
nor for the present, for life has the right of way: 11Was Irn 
' Gesang soll leben mu ss im Leben untergehn.n Thus between op-
timism and pessimism a "via media 11 is going to be found which 
shall be called Meliorism. According to this new way of think-
ing , the significant thing is neither the good nor the evil 
found in the world, but the progress of the world. The uni-
verse is neither the best possible nor the worst possible, but 
I just in the process of becoming a better world through each 
j, individual contribution and cooperati on. 
I 
i 
But the highest good can be achieved only by 
our getting our proper life; and tha t can come 
about only by he lp of a moral energy born of 
the fal th that in some way or other we shall 
succeed in ge tting it if we try pertinaciously 
enough. 3 
Through a working process in which each one is doing his 
J part, the world is going to be saved. 11 Plt.U"al ism, ••• is neither 
I 
I 
!
1 
3william James , The Will to Believe, 102. 
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mptimistic nor pessimistic, but melioristic, r a ther. The 
world, it thinks, may be saved on condi tlon that 1 ts parts 
shall do their best. 114 According to this theory advocated by 
Jame s, salvation is 11 neither necessary nor impossible," it is 
a possibility which becomes a probability when salvation is 
more and more made possible . 5 
Meliorism is a pluralo-democratic concept of which so-
ciety an:i its morals are playing a p rominent p art. 11 The 
melioristic tmiverse is conceived after a social analogy, as a 
pluralism of independent powers. 116 The success rests upon the 
accornp l ished wol~k :: 11 If none worl<: , it will fail. 11 From these 
I 
statements the difference between empiricism and rationalisnl 
I 
may be a g ain noticed with J ames stand ing for the first . Ra-
tionalism would not accept any happ~nings while emp iricism be-
l lieving in possibilities, is willing to formulate its universe 
in hypoth etica l propositions. 117 
2. Mora lism and Voluntarism. 
In a foregoing quotation8 the 11highest good11 and its pos-
sible achievements; the 11 moral energyu and the faith in its 
s uccess, have introduced James's doctrine of pluralistic mora~ 
ism. 11 'rhi s wm ... ld is good, we liiUS t say, since it is what we 
9 
make it--and we shall make it good. 11 
gW:iJl1iam :J.ames .) '" Some Problems of Philosophy, 142. 
?r:_agmi1~ 1~-~' 2t56. 
6some Problems of PhilC>S\Ophy, 228-229. 7 - -
8gu. • c 1 t • , 229 • 
9 r. pag e 7. The t'ii ll to Believe, 102. 
The Absolute presents a sort of Nirvana; it assures 
security, peace, an::i r•e st. Or, as James himself says:: · 11 All 
is needed and essential--even you with your sick soul and 
10 
heart. All are one with God and with God all is well ." 
On the other hand, James affirms evil to be essentially irra-
tional and irrelevant. 11 In other words the problem of evil 
is not going to be solved through metaphysics, for it is only 
a practical problem. Wnat is at ... ·; stake is not to under-
stand evil but to suppress it . 12 Or, as Perr•y says when in-
terpreting J ames's pluralistic moralism: 
It is not denied that good, evil, and indiffer-
ence are related ••• It is denied that value must 
be so defined as to embrace indifference, or 
good so defined as to provide for evil. Hence 
goodness is not to be chai·~ed. with or judged by 
the evil tha t attends it .l 
'l'hus act:ton is only made po ssible in a world v;here there 
il 
!I 
!' 
I 
I 
II 
\I 
I 
I 
is much to be done; it is only in an incomplete world that the II 
individuals can really contribute something. "This life is 1! 
·worth living, ••• since it is what we make it, from the moral 
ooint of view." 14 iilhat Jarnes wants to get at is to pi•ove t hat 
through man's l abor and fighting 11 something is eternally 
(I gained fol~ the universe by success."15 r.rhe individual, by 
lOpragma tism, 292. 
llThe Varieties of Re ligious Experience, 133. Cf ., The Will 
Believe, 61, 169. 
l2A Pluralistic Universe, 124. 
l3Ralph B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, 246. 
14w.tt:tliam Jame s, The Will to Believe, 61. 
15rbid., 61. 
il 
:\ j, 
I 
98 
., 
I~ 
i! 
.. 
I' 
II 
!I 
o 0T II '· 
working"his ov-m salvation, contr•ibutes to the salvation of' the II 
II 
'I 
world which is going to ove rcon1e evil only piece by piece and i 
16 
as the result of man' s behavior. With this "eventually pos-
sible 11 William James affirms that "If we do our best, and the 
- - -
other pov1ers do theil" best, the world will be perfected . 1117 
Of what use will be the Freedcm of which James arl"ived 1 
I 
! 
through the foreign influences of which we have been speaking .1 \J 
Freedom led hlm to exercise the 'Will; and the exercise of the 1!' 
---- I 
will brings forth action. Volunta rism and Activism are the 
result of Freedom. Combined they make a vital meliorism tak-
lng the individual out of "this dumb re g ion of' the he a rt in 
which we dwell alone with OUl' vdlling ness and unwillingness, 
18 
our f a iths and fears . 11 
How can we be surprised now that Renouvier ' s liberty be -
carne dear to James? This freedom made activism possible . The 
world is filled with possibilities , unfinished f a cts which are 
"realities with which we have actively to deal . 1119 The pas-
sivity and contemplativeness of monism appear out of place at 
this time. "Le fant~me de la n~cessit~ p~se sur la nuit de 
l'histoire, la libert~ est una aurore . 1120 The determinism and 
intellectua lism, criticized in the previou s chapters, and the 
16cf . Pragma tism, 294. 
17some Problems of Philosophy, 230. 
i~'rhe ~Jill to Believe, 62 . 
Loc . cit . , 62 . 
20charles Renouvier, Essay, II, 91. 
1:1' 
(\ 
I• 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I, 
il 
'I !I 
' I 
99 
I Absolute having already a ccomplished all, become now not only 
I 
I 
obsolete but i rru110 :r•a1 :: 11Volunta:r•ism and plur alism tog ether 
. . . i d 1 ' h . t . It 21 cha lleng e the ll1dlV r ua ~o erolc ac lOn. 
It ::JJ.ay not be superfluous to notice that the unity of 
-f-Ife--
Plura l ism which we have set in opposition wi th1 oneness of 
mon ism finds at this point a mope concrete e:A'}llanat:ton. "If 
none work , 11 failure is the result, but if the 11 eaches 11 work in 
perfect cooperation and unific a tion let the ode to ··- · :_! v ictory 
be sung , for the universe is in t h e process of being s aved~ 
B. Pluralism and Pragmatism. 
1. The Pragmatic Method. 
Berg son's influences, we have s a id, led J ames to re_nmmce 
intellectua lism. Ho -wever, justice must be done to another 
gre a t t h inker whose influence James also acknowledges. 
Justice obliges me to say tha t for the teachings 
of my colleague, Dr. Josiah Hoyce, I should 
neither have g rasped its full force nor made 
my ovvn practica l and p sycholo&ical p oint of view 
as clear to myself as i t is.2;:;: 
'rh us, as curiou s as it may se em , it vms partl:v through 
monism t hat the pr agmatic-plural world was d i scovered by J ames. 
·The i mpossibility of exte r•ioriza t:ton of an;,r idea from the mind 
s t ruck ~villiarn J ames a nd appeared to him as a defect. He saw 
i t unfruitful, s olipsistic, a nd therefore, impractical: 
21Harl~y E. Rosenberger, vVilli am J amest s Philosophy of Will, 72. 
(Unpublished dissertation, Ne v1 York University, 1912.) 
, 
22wi1lia.m J ame s, Th e l1ie a.ning of 'rruth, 22. (Poot note) 
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If your feeling bear no fruit s in my vwrld, ••• 
I call it a so lips ism, and c a ll its wo1~ ld a 
cirear:a- world.23 
II 
II 
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li 
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Now 1 t is clear l y seen also why J ames dis regarded reason: il 
lj 
" .Against rationalism as a pretention and a me chod. p r agmati s m 
is fully arme ci and. mi lit ant. n24 Jarnes is no w f1~eeing himself 
from wh~t has been a cknowledged a s true from the beginning of 
the history of thought: 
The work begun by Zeno, and continued by Htune, 
ant, Herbart, Hegel, and Bradley , does not stop 
till sensible reality lies enti r•e ly dis integr a ted 
a t the fe e t of treason' .25 
Now can be seen why h e passed from concepts to percepts: 
I, 
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"Instead of b eing interpreters of reality, concepts negate the ~~ 
inwardne ss of rea lity a ltogether." 26 Now, Wi lliam James h a s 
re a ched one of the most imp ortant points of his philosophy: 
"The function of the intellect is practical rather than 
27 theoretical. 11 We have a lso pointed out how James st a rted by , 
looking at things fr•om the beginning of his changing career 
throughout his life. The direction of his thought wi ll be 
henceforth foe used upon the concrete. He refuses. to start by 
criticising om~ means of knowledge like Kant, but rather ad-
vacates the possibility of knowledge by creating it. He be-
lieves that existence can be previous to the knowledge of ex-
~~The ~~reaning of Truth, 23. 
Pragmatism, 54. 25A Plm~alistic Universe, 247. 
26rbid., 246. 
27 Ibid., 247. (Underlining mine) 
!j 
!I 
!I 
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istence, and, therefore, knowing a thing cannot change the 
thing itself. In other words the relations betwee n beings can 
change wi thout producing any change among these beings. 
If we are empiricists and go from parts to 
wholes, we believe that beings may first ex-
ist and feed so to speak on their own exis-
tence, and t~~n secondarily become known to 
one another. 
'rhe metaphysical disputes concerning the universe can nov1 
be answe red. To the questions: Is the universe one or many? 
Is it a free or determined universe? Is it matter or mind? 
James gives the answer through a "pragmatic method." VJhere 
there are practical consequences, there must be the truth. 
'L'he world can be one or many Ol"' anything else, 11 If no practi-
cal difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives 
mean practically the sa...'lle thing, and all dispute is idle.n 29 
The original meaning of the word ''-rf(~#~ ' means action, 
and the words · practice, practical, and pragmatism are derived 
from it. The pragmatic method tries merely to interpret the 
different vie ws on the basis of its respective practical con-
sequences. 
Abstraction, reason, static theories, causality, and 
monistic absolutism, criticized by J ames in the previous chap-
ters find here a comprehensive explanation: 
28;'illiam James, A PlUl"'alistic Universe, 61 . 29Pragmatism, 45 . 
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A Pragmatist turns his back resolutely and 
once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits 
dear to professional philosophers . He turns 
away from abstraction ·and insufficiency, from 
verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, 
from fixed principles, closed sys terns, and 
pretended abs olutes and origins. He turns 
toward concreteness and adequacy , towards facts, 
towards action and towards power . That means 
the empiricist temper regnant and the ration-
alist temper sincerely g iven up. It means 
the open air and possibilities of nature, as 
II 
II 
' I 
I 
I 
I I 
l' 
against dogma, artificiality , and the pretence 1 
of finality in truth.30 1 1
1 The worl:i of" James is "wha t we make it;" "the cognition of" I 
a truth 11 is found in 11 a faith YJhich is involved in the crea tion l! 
of the truth; 11 what vve desire we must 11 inexpugnably believe, 11 
11
1
1
; 
and 11 the belief creates its verification; 11 and the thought is \i 
the 11 father of the fact. 1131 
Pragmatism is intimately related to pluralism ; it is one 1 
I 
II 
of its most important characteristics for there are found the 1 
major arguments showing the impossibility of adapting the 
pragmatic method to the monistic way of thinking. For pragma- 1 
I, 
tism, according to James's ovm words , is 
The attitude of looking a way from first things, 
principles, 'categories ,t supposed necessities; 
and of looking towards last things, fruits, con-
sequences, facts.32 
3
3°1Hilliam James, Pra~matismi 51. The Will To Bel!ev , 102- 03. 
'')'"' 
'- .c Pragmatism, 55. . 
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2. The New 'I1heory of Truth. 
i! 
i 
i 
! 
I 
Pluralism has been presented as offering grBat possibili- 1: 
II ties for change and novelty. It is knO\"ffi that fi•om the e a rly 
!I 
:I Greek thinkers to our modern era lo gic has been the basis for 
the search for truth. Shall t he di a lectica l method, emphasized ! 
! 
Vdhat ~~~' 
The notion that 11 no theory is 
11
.
1 
by Hege l, still le ad the way in the search for reality? 
about novelty so dear to Jame s? 
absolutely a transcript of real ity , a and that "old facts 11 must 
j: 
be surn:.nari zed and 11 l ead to new one s, 1133 became very acute in 
!I 
Jame s's thinl{ing . Will Dux•ant says that "when Har•r is and others 1! 
!, 
'I 
began to i mport a moribund Hegelianism into Ameri ca , J ames re- II 
acted like a quarantine officer who has de tected an i m.rni gr ant 
i nfec t ion.n34 This rathe r crude statement does not gi ve much 
light. The f act is that James in search of truth, wa s shifting 
from dialectic s peculations to an instrmaental theory of truth: 
AnY idea ••• that will carry us prosperously from 
any one part of our experience to any other part, 
link ing things satisfactorily, working securely; 
simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so 
much, true in so f ax• fort h , true instruraentalb r.35 
J a..rne s a cknowledges novelty. Vvherefore, t here mus t be 
somewhere a place for a new ele1nent to be grafted upon the 
ancient stock . New ideas and new experiences must be just as 
true as old one s. If it is asked wh at is the criterion of 
33pragrnatism , 57. 
~gThe Story of Philosophy, 556. 
Pragmatism, 58. 
' 
'I II 
!I 
I' 
'I 
il 
truth of the new stock it may be answered again that it is 
merely based on pragmatic tests. Or, to give William Jarnes 1 s 
own words: 
Her only test of probabl·e truth is what works 
best in the way of leading us, what fits every 
part of life best and combines with the collec-
tivity of experiencE#s demands, nothing being 
omitted. 36 
In order to show how far James is from the absolutist 
theories of truth, a few more striking statements may be pre-
sented. The characteristics of pluralism can be detected in 
statements auch as: nr ruth exists ante rem just as much and 
as little as the other things do. 1137 The monist claims that 
truth can neV!er be the result of any process, but James af-
firms that 11 Truth is made, just as health , wealth and strength 
are rnade . 1138 Said differently this means plainly that that is 
true today is all right; let us live and rest upon it; but 
what is true today may not be true tomorrow: 11 We live for,_-, 
wards . 1139 
The bellicose attitude of William James is here explained 
and seen as inevitable. On the one hand the monist speaks 
about claims, obligations, reality already made, or even 
11 ready-made 11 and having nothing to do v.rhatsoever with personal 
or practical problems . On the other hand , the professor of 
36
7Pragmatism, 80. 3 Ibi '~ 221 38 '-~-•' • 
39 rbid. ., 218. Ibid., 223. 
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Harv ard stands for process, mutation, for possible .new truth, . 
for i mproving truth, for absolute truth whi ch is not, but has 
' 40 to be maae . 
C. Pluralism and Religion. 
1. J ame s's Phi losophy of Relig ion. 
Our purpose in these few l a st wol"'ds is not the analysis 
of James's theory of re ligion but our aim is merely to shed 
more light on . what has b e en said above ·,_ h1 ·1 e xpounding Fech-
ner's influences upon J ames. 
I· II ,, 
" ; . 
•I 
II 
H 
I 
i 
it 
:I 
I 
I 
I . 
;, 
il 
!I 
:I 
:, 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
'I 
11 
il ,, 
~~~hat are the consequences of p luralism on religion? i1 
,; 
il Vvnat is the plura listic emphasis in th is realm? For J ames the I 
method of relig ious philosophy rests u p on a n ind ivi dua listic I 
., 
experience. In religion as anywhere else the pluralist is and ;~1 remains an e mp iricist. 'l'hus the two g reat a ttributes of re- ~~~ 
ligion are, for WiLLiam J ames, individualism and empir icism. 
"'ell. 11 41 \'.·•;""a t !, 1, Religion is also 11 a p o stulator of new facts as  1u j • 
I 
I is his d.efini tion of relig ion? Is there found in it some place
1 
for p lural elements? Be c ause the defin itions of religion a re 
!I 
i' so numerous and so different J ames finds in that the guaranty 
I 
I 
I 
11 tha t the word 'relig ion ' cannot stand for any single princi-
I' He cri ti- I! 
cizes the tendency of 11 over-simp lificat:ton" which is infesting 1, 
ple or essence, but is rather a collective name.n42 
4 0tJill1a.m James, Pragmat ism, 224. 
41The Varie ties of Heligious EJQ;)erip,nce, 518. 
42 Ibid., 26. 
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absolutism. He prefers instead of the concept of one essence 
accepts passively the s aving experiences; empiricism rests on 
faith, the faith which makes the facts and overcomesl 
2. The God of James. 
'I I. 
il 
! 107 
j' 
I 
I 
I 
"First, it is essential, 11 says James, 11 that God be con- II 
ceived as the deepest power in the universe ."44 But a second [ 
conception of God is that of a "mental personality" which is to ll 
be regarded "like any other pe rsonality ." Now, in spite of 
Ja.>nes' s claim that 11 behind this un:tverse God simply is and will 
be forever, " 45 it cannot be deduced that such is his prevalent ! 
theory. Below are a fe w lines introducing his concept of a 
limited God. of which mention has already been made in the 
second chapter . 
1fhe ideal power with which we feel ourselves in 
connection, the ~God' of ordinary men, is, both 
4~e Varities of Religious ~xperience, 26. 
44Tl.~e 'H ll to Be lb3ve, 122 • 
45rbid., 1:35. 
II 
It 
I! 
by ordlnury men and by philosophers, endowed 
v!ith certa in of those metaphysi c a l att1• ibute s 
wh ich in the 1ectu1•e on philosophy I treated 
with such disrespect ••• The notion of many 
finite g ods is one which hardly any one thinks 
it worth vihi le to consider ••• Nevertheless ••• 
relig ious experience ••• cannot be cited as un-
equivoc a lly sup porting the inf:tni tist belief. 46 
:I I 
!I 
I' 
:j 
I, 
.Jame s cuts loose from the a b soluti st as sumpti on and claims II 
that from its origin the world existed in "pluralistic form . " ~~ 
To him Go d need not be "the a bsolute whole of things , rather I, 
:I 
the life of religious experience should regard him 11 as a part . 11 1i 
By 11 part 11 James means to say that even if 11 the mos t essential 
part 11 is played by Go d it is never•theless a pa rt a nd not a 
tot a lity . 4 7 
'11h e solution of the problem of evil , whi ch we have shown 
to be imp ossible with monism , becomes at this point v ery easy 
to solve and to uncmrstand with p luralism. Ev il exists and 
48 God himself fights it togethe r vii thus . .d .. nd this contribu -
tion of the individual wor king with God, is man's pride ; that 
I' 
.I 
I 
i 
I 
makes life wo1"th living . 49 Jame s is not aiming at a polytheisrn li 
! 
' r ather he likes to feel, in the world, many consciousnesses 
different fr om his own. This make s the universe richer . Limi J; 
I! 
ed resp onsi b ilities, limited powe i' s , limited a uthority, with il 
'I I 
all possible complexities in trial and combined a ctions working ii 
together , a re nmking up the unive rse. 50 In sum , James presents 
4 6The Varieties of 4~er., Io1tt . , 102. Rel igious ~xperience, 525 . 
II ll 
" I' 
!/ 
489cr ., Pr agmatism, Cf., 'l'he Vdll to 
iJ ~Ocr ., Pragmatism, 
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Beli eve, 60 . 
290~ and A Pluralistic Universe , 308- 309 . !I !I 
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II 
I I 
I 
il 
I li 
II 
!, 
a finite God who cares, p1~ote ct s , and helps finite individuals . il 
He leans toward a personal God who answers our call. A God I 
who is a friend, a fellow-worker fighting with us the fight 11 
vmich shall abolish evil and lead to peace and to a free 1 
societ~ of individuals and nations. 51 But God is not the ab-
solute , for he i s a part of the pluralistic universe. 
Having an envirorunent , being in time, and work -
ing in time, and wo rking out a history just like 
ourselves, he (God) escapes from the fo reigness 
from all that is human , of the static timeless 
perfect absolute.52 
Thus , James reaches in his philos ophy of religion another 
gre at climax in favor of pluralism. Religi on a nd God himself 
are no more a hindrance to the pluralistic concept of the 1 
I 
universe, but Pluralism trimnphs wlth God vmile the Absolute 
is dethroned . 
5lcf., Jean Wahl, Les Philosophies Pluralistes, 173. 
52A :Pluralistic Universe, 318. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ve conclude our exposition by a brief swrunary of the 
problems and character i stics of James which have appeared in 
the present thesis. 
Through the home influences he rece ived a strong re-
li 
i; 
]I 
!i'l 
I' 
!I 
II 
il II 
II 
II 
II 
!I 
:I 
il 
I 
ligious tendency of which h e partly attributed the reasons for 
1 
his "sick soul.ul But James travelledL Geor§e H . PaJmer a f-
firms t hat 11 A scholar is hardly grown up until he makes anotbe 
national outlook h is ovm. 11 Precisely: this James realized 
I 
I 
!r 
fully. VIe have followed him in Brazil , in Paris, in Berl i n, 
in Geneva, studying and thinking for hims elf. )I James bee ame a '' i' 
r 
student at the Lawrence Scientific Sch ool in Ca..111bri d.g e, took j 
h is lVl . D . degree a.'Yld taught Coinparative Anatomy and Physlologyl 
The professor of Physiology was soon led to t h e d omain of ! 
psychic research and, extending again h is range of interest, 
James arr ived at his philosophical speculations. 
I 
I 
Through fo~e ign i nfluenc es he arrived gradually a t his 
pluralistic c cncept. Renouvier h e lped h i rn to f i nd freedom, I 
and Fechner introduced him to the doctrine of the limited 
wh ile Bergson led hi:u to h is anti - inte llec tualistic b i as . 
God; 1 
1 
"I t wa s from France that ·wi lliam Jame s .f irs t received his 
philosoph ic inspiration. 11 A review of Emile Bou troux ' s 
William James. Jour . of Phil . , Psychol . , and sci. Methods, 
8(1911) , 583. 
I ( 
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I 
of all thi ngs; that the univers e is one, a 11 incluc.ied in the 1 
Absolute is at the ant i podes of \lvilliam James's concept~ such ! 
cannot be the real world. 11 
The plura listic interpretation of reality as conceived by \1 
Wil liam James, offers a universe worth having, worth work i ng 
I 
;I 
for, and worth fighting for. A world in. which the lack of as- ll 
:I 
:, surance is c orapensated by t h e p ower of individual creative 
~ i 
achi evements; a hworld initwhit~h truth is l mdadhe ... retlevat· hnt . andf a.pd- ~1 1 
plicable to al l wnan s ua ~ons; a wor w ere ru l S oun 
in and through human experience. The pluralistic interpreta-
tion of reality is, for J ames, a de scription of the universe as 
!!, j 
i' 
II 
it appears to b e when look ed at objectively with its bright and!l 
'I dark s pots, g ood and evil schemes. lt'or J ames a unified life lj 
is desirable but tha t unity must be fought for in order to be ' 
attained . The individual must have falth, the indivldual must I 
will , the individual must strive ! If James cries: away with ~~~ 
all oneness and deverminism 1 t is because unity is neither pre- l,l 
establi shed , nor yet assured, but rather is a goal to be a t-
1 
tained. The pluralistic system is made up als o of freedom and ! 
moral creative activity, or as clant~ana~ay~ , a life of action 
bring ing forth work to fruition. 1 
It has appe ared as the most commendable procedure to pre -
sent p lurali s m a s a description of r·eality , then emp iricism as 
I 
I 
I 
laeorge Santayana, Character & Op inion in the United States, 91.1 
II 
li 
1 1:2 
1: 
lj 
I 
I 
II ,, 
!I 
I' 
t\ 
t: 
I 
I· 
a method , and finally pragmatism as an attitude. They a ll 1 
have a ~Hre ct connection with the .: JP>i.ecemeal 1' plural is tic i[ 
I 
theory of William James. Pluralis m sprang up from the tendency \! 
,, 
great incomplete thing going on incessantly in .all its flux, !I 
diversity, endless change , and filled with transformation 
!I 
!j 
and 11 
i! 
II 
•' 
disorderly struggle which do not interfere with a kind of free 
! I ,, 
tl 
" 
harmony. 
Thus defined, pluralism leads naturally to meliorism. il In t: 
'I 
,, 
order to attain the ideal, man is using his freedom to fi ght 
the contrary evil forces of a ·world whi ch is neith er good nor 
a ltogether evil, but in the process of improvement. .A s a di-
rect consequence, pragmatism enters the scene showing the 
truth through the emphasis of the particular , the concrete, 
li 
I! 
ii ,, 
:. 
11 
:. 
r 
and a plurality of' reality. Vie have set forth also, th a t t h e ~~~ 
p l uralism of James combines the theory of the will ( a creative \ 
will) , ernpiri cism , fre e dom, indi v i:iual ism, and religion. 'I It isll 
a system whose aim is to find thing s in themselves , in their I,J 
particular character in order to separate and insulate them 
lt 
il 
!I 
·· from one another . It is the accept auc·61 of negativeness, of 
contradiction, and t h e affirmation of effort . It insists that \' 
parts of l"eality can be known independently, and that new 
knowledge can be added to past knowledge without having the 
latter modified by the former. Finally , in its philosophy of 
1113 
religion, the pluralis1n of James faces frankly the problem of 
evil a nd by an advocacy of faith (a cpeative faith) enlarges 
tremendo usly known hoPizons and opens new ones. The reality of 
evil has been discovered, and the adjus tments to overthrow it 
are being made with the help of God; a God ~ho i s not the 
Absolute, not the whole, but merely a part of the whole. 
'fhe pluralistic theory is that of 11 ever not quite. 11 It is 
a dynamic philosophy which appeals to the pragmatic, scienti-
fie, and activistic present age because of its concrete, and 
empirical elements. It appeals to our revolutionary and hu-
manisti c age because it refuses to reduce reality to one ulti-
ma te form of being, but stands for independence, real chance, 
and novelty; there defeat is as possible as victory, daranation 
a s possible as salva tion; ther•e evil and good are rela ted by 
strugg le ; there can be found neither determinism Ol"' destiny , 
butor instead of a passive spectator, opens the widest and 
most cha l lenging perspectives. Future g enerations will tell if 
such a p lura listic concept of the universe h a s arrived at re -
al ity, has taken away illusion s, and has left genuine hope. 
I 
I 
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I. 
Finall~ William James has shown great independence of 
thinking; he has. thought for himself reinterpreting his tori-
cal influences in his o wn way; he advocates a system of' 
thought vihich he has experienced himself. William James is 
considered by many as a revolutionary philosopher but he will 
become a classic and prominent representative of the modern 
school of thought. A.S Edwards, as Emerson, he marks already 
an epoch in the history of American philosophy, not to speak 
of the general rec~gnition and increasing interest throughout 
the whole world. 
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